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“FOREIGN AGENTS” IN AN
INTERCONNECTED WORLD: FARA AND THE
WEAPONIZATION OF TRANSPARENCY
NICK ROBINSON†
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) is a sweeping and
generally underenforced public-disclosure statute. Enacted in 1938,
FARA was used during World War II to target fascist propaganda, but
by the 1960s its enforcement had shifted to lobbyists and publicrelations firms for foreign governments. After the 2016 presidential
election, FARA has gained favor among policymakers and prosecutors
as a central tool to respond to a range of foreign influence in U.S.
politics,
including
foreign
lobbying,
electioneering,
and
disinformation.
This Article argues that FARA’s breadth creates substantial risk that
it will be used in a politicized manner. In the past decade, analogous
transparency laws in other countries—often justified by reference to
FARA—have been weaponized to target dissenting voices with the
stigma and burden of registering as a “foreign agent.” This Article
undertakes an analysis of FARA to show how its broad and unclear
provisions make FARA susceptible to being similarly used in the
United States, especially against nonprofits, the media, and public
officials. It examines three cases in which FARA was arguably enforced
in a politicized manner, explains why strengthening the Act’s
enforcement would likely exacerbate this problem, and discusses the
Act’s potential constitutional deficiencies under the Supreme Court’s
recent First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Article ends by weighing the merits of using FARA to address
different types of foreign influence. It posits that transparency
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provisions like those in FARA are most appropriate, and on strongest
ground, when applied to (1) those who clearly are acting at the direction
or control of a foreign government or political party; and (2) when the
covered activity involves core democratic processes, such as lobbying
or electioneering. It warns that using FARA to target disinformation is
unlikely to be effective and presents a high risk of politicized abuse.
Based on these insights, it suggests three potential strategies for FARA
reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) is a publicdisclosure statute enacted in 1938 to combat foreign propaganda in the
United States.1 It requires “agents” of foreign principals engaged in
covered activities to register with the Justice Department as “foreign
agents” and comply with extensive reporting requirements, including
making a “conspicuous statement” on informational materials that
they are acting on behalf of a foreign principal.2 Violations of the Act
can result in fines or up to five years in jail.3
FARA has a remarkably sweeping ambit, but until recently, it has
existed in relative obscurity. Between 1966 and 2015, the Justice
Department only brought seven criminal prosecutions and seventeen
civil cases under the Act.4 One can easily get through law school
without its mention, and there is relatively little academic scholarship

1. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2018)); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION’S ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 2 (2016) [hereinafter IG FARA REPORT] (“From its
passage in 1938 until amendments made in 1966, FARA primarily focused on propagandists.”).
2. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (requiring those covered under the Act to register as “an agent of a
foreign principal”); 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (detailing FARA’s labeling requirements); see also Part
II(E).
3. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2).
4. IG FARA REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (“[B]etween 1966 and 2015, the Department . . .
[brought] seven criminal FARA cases – one resulted in a conviction at trial . . . . , two pleaded
guilty to violating FARA, two others pleaded guilty to non-FARA charges, and the remaining
two cases were dismissed.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2062. Foreign Agents Registration Act
Enforcement, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, in U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2018)
[hereinafter DOJ ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY], https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resourcemanual-2062-foreign-agents-registration-act-enforcement
[http://perma.cc/D7WC-R55Q]
(“[T]here have been 17 civil cases in that period, of which 10 were successfully litigated and 7
ended by consent decree. The number of administrative resolutions is much greater.”).
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on the Act itself.5 Although there are perennial complaints by
members of Congress, transparency groups, and others about FARA’s
underenforcement,6 there is also longstanding confusion about what is
actually covered by the Act, or even its purpose. Today, many see it
primarily as a tool to provide transparency for lobbyists of foreign
governments.7 Some continue to view it as a way to undermine
propaganda or disinformation.8 And still others see FARA as a way to
combat foreign interference in U.S. elections.9 As one member of
Congress noted in a failed effort to reform the Act in the early 1990s:
“FARA is either widely misunderstood, ignored, poorly written, not
enforced or all of the above.”10
Recent concern about foreign influence in U.S. democracy has
thrust FARA into the spotlight of national politics. Special Counsel
Robert Mueller, who investigated Russian interference in the 2016
U.S. presidential election, brought multiple charges, including failure

5. Legal scholarship on FARA is generally dated and has frequently been driven by student
notes. See, e.g., Michael I. Spak, America for Sale: When Well-Connected Former Federal Officials
Peddle Their Influence to the Highest Foreign Bidder—A Statutory Analysis and Proposals for
Reform of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Ethics in Government Act, 78 KY. L.J. 237
(1989) (suggesting a proposal to reform FARA to better address lobbying by former public
officials); Jahad Atieh, Note, Foreign Agents: Updating FARA to Protect American Democracy,
31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1051 (2010) (arguing for increasing disclosure requirements of lobbying
activities under FARA); Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the ‘Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity’ on
Foreign Lobbyists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1151 (1996) (observing changes made to
FARA in 1995 amendments); Ava Marion Plakins, Note, Heat Not Light: The Foreign Agents
Registration Act After Meese v. Keene, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 184 (1987) (reviewing FARA’s
legislative history and calling for the end of labeling covered material “political propaganda”).
6. See, e.g., Lydia Dennett, Opinion, The ‘Foreign Agents’ Law Paul Manafort Is Charged
with Breaking Is Wildly Underenforced, VOX (Nov. 3, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/thebig-idea/2017/11/3/16596484/fara-foreign-agents-registration-manafort-enforcement-scandal
[https://perma.cc/P89L-GCA7] (reporting statements from an advocate from Project on
Government Oversight calling for strengthened enforcement of FARA and noting both
longstanding underenforcement of FARA and complaints about it).
7. DOJ ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 4 (noting that in 1966 FARA was
“amended to focus on the integrity of the United States Government decision-making process”
after the “excesses of lobbyists” attempting to secure sugar quotas for foreign interests); see also
Part V.A.1.
8. See infra Part V.A.3.
9. See infra Part V.A.2.
10. Modification of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938: Hearing on H.R. 1725, H.R.
1381, and H.R. 806 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 28 (1991) (statement of Rep. Dan Glickman, Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
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to register under FARA, against Paul Manafort,11 Richard Gates,12 and
members of Russia’s Internet Research Agency.13 In November 2017,
at the request of the Justice Department, RT TV America and Sputnik,
both of which are media organizations funded by the Russian
government that operate in the U.S., registered as “foreign agents”
under the Act.14 Certain members of Congress have written to the
Justice Department asking it also to investigate whether Chinese media
organizations,15 Al Jazeera,16 and even former Secretary of State John
Kerry17 should have to register as well. After this congressional
prodding, in September 2018, the Justice Department asked two

11. Indictment at 26, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-00201-ABJ (D.D.C. filed Oct.
30, 2017). Paul Manafort was the Chairman of Donald Trump’s presidential election campaign
from June to August of 2016. US Election: Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort Quits, BBC
(Aug.
19,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37134440
NEWS
[https://perma.cc/T22V-MRME].
12. Indictment at 26, Manafort, No. 1: 17-cr-00201-ABJ. Richard Gates was a business
associate of Paul Manafort and his deputy when Manafort was Chairman of Trump’s presidential
election campaign. Josh Gerstein, Former Manafort Deputy Rick Gates Testifies Against Greg
Craig, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2019, 4:05PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/22/rick-gatestrial-greg-craig-1471698 [https://perma.cc/7MAZ-XKWC]. In January 2019, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP settled with the Justice Department for $4.6 million for failure to
register under FARA for work they did for Paul Manafort in relation to Ukraine. The Podesta
group and Mercury Public Affairs are also being investigated for failing register under FARA.
Kenneth P. Vogel & Matthew Goldstein, Law Firm To Pay $4.6 Million in Case Tied To Manafort
and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/
politics/skadden-arps-ukraine-lobbying-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/HP9M-L8T4].
13. Indictment at 19–20, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter IRA Indictment].
14. Megan R. Wilson, Russian News Outlet Sputnik Registers with DOJ as Foreign Agent,
HILL (Nov. 11, 2017, 1:15 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-alobbying/360912-russian-news-outlet-sputnik-registers-with-doj-as [https://perma.cc/MK5FSAF9].
15. Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy et al. to Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/eccdcf1b-82d0-47f3-90a4-3d01635d1255/
B457BF238E2795509242A4E24CDB54CF.011618-pjl-letter-to-doj.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT32RNBA].
16. Letter from Rep. Josh Gottheimer et al. to Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions (Mar. 6, 2018)
[hereinafter Congressional Letter concerning Al Jazeera], https://zeldin.house.gov/sites/
zeldin.house.gov/files/3.6_zeldin_gottheimer_cruz_letter_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSS2CUFC].
17. Senator Kerry was accused of needing to register for meeting with a delegation from
Iran. Letter from Sen. Marco Rubio to Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions (Sept. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
Rubio
Letter],
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0327b105-5a76-474d-9a62f89764b149d6/98C4654552603811A4B6CE945ADF255F.9-18-18-letter-to-attorney-general-jeffsession-on-former-secstate-kerry....pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7M-EDDT].
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Chinese media organizations, Xinhua News Agency and China Global
Television Network, to register under FARA.18
Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have proposed
strengthening the enforcement of FARA, broadening the reach of the
statute, or both.19 In fact, in the 115th Congress alone, over a dozen
FARA-related bills were introduced, with provisions ranging from
strengthening the Justice Department’s power to investigate violations
of the Act to narrowing the Act’s “academic exemption” so FARA
would better capture perceived foreign influence at U.S. universities.20
Since FARA has recently become one of the most prominent and
central responses of policymakers to address a range of forms of
foreign influence in U.S. politics, it is worth asking how the Act actually
operates. On its face, FARA is startlingly broad: it applies equally to
“agents” of a foreign government—like Saudi Arabia—or of a foreign
person or entity—such as a Japanese company like Toyota, a nonprofit
based abroad like Amnesty International, or a foreign-based media
organization such as The Guardian.21 Covered activity under the Act
includes attempts to influence U.S. public opinion on any foreign or
domestic policy issue;22 soliciting or disbursing anything of value;23 or
disseminating oral, visual, or written information of any kind for or in

18. Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State
Media Firms To Register as Foreign Agents, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:50 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-has-ordered-key-chinese-state-media-firms-toregister-as-foreign-agents-1537296756 [https://perma.cc/55WD-QR76].
19. For a list of FARA-related bills introduced in the 115th and 116th Congresses, see INT’L
CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., http://www.icnl.org/programs/US%20Programs/FARA%
20home.html [https://perma.cc/6S76-6NKA]. For example, in the 116th Congress, Senate Bill 1762
is co-sponsored by Republican Senator Grassley and Democratic Senator Feinstein, among
others. S.1762 – Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act of 2019,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1762 [https://perma.cc/
46RB-NFHC].
20. See INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., http://www.icnl.org/programs/US
%20Programs/FARA%20home.html [https://perma.cc/6S76-6NKA] (listing previously
introduced FARA legislation such as H.R. 5336, which would limit the exemption for academic
activity,
H.R.5336
–
Foreign
Influence
Transparency
Act,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5336 [https://perma.cc/VVX2-BZYD],
and H.R. 4170, which would provide the Justice Department with civil demand authority to
investigate FARA violations, H.R.4170 – Disclosing Foreign Influence Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4170 [https://perma.cc/UJD7-VDJC]).
21. 22 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2018); see also infra Part II.B (describing the definition of foreign
principal under the FARA).
22. See 22. U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(i); id. § 611(o); see also infra Part II.B (describing covered
activities under FARA).
23. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(iii).
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the interest of a foreign principal.24 Unlike a traditional principal–agent
relationship, an agency relationship under the Act does not require
“direction” or “control” by the principal over the agent, or even the
consent of either party. Instead, it can be created if someone in the
United States acts at the mere “request” of a foreign principal.25 For
example, if a nonprofit in Chicago sets up a public meeting at the
“request” of a Canadian nonprofit partner to discuss the best way to
fight the opioid epidemic, the Chicago nonprofit would arguably need
to register as a “foreign agent”: in setting the public meeting, the
Chicago nonprofit would be attempting to influence U.S. public
opinion on a domestic policy issue at the “request” of a foreign
principal—the Canadian nonprofit.
Admittedly, there are important exemptions to registering under
the Act, including those for many commercial, religious, or academic
activities.26 However, these exemptions still leave a broad swath of
behavior covered by FARA, particularly for nonprofits, media
organizations, and public officials.27 FARA’s sweeping—and generally
underenforced—provisions could be understood as a benefit, allowing
the Act to lie dormant and then, when necessary, providing wide
latitude for the Justice Department to go after perceived “nefarious”
foreign influence.
This Article makes a different argument. It claims that FARA’s
broad language makes it particularly susceptible to politicized
enforcement. Although ostensibly a transparency statute, FARA can
be “weaponized,” using the stigmatizing—and frequently misleading
or inaccurate—label of “foreign agent” and the burdens of registration
to punish dissenting or controversial views.
To see the insidious and widespread damage foreign-agent-type
laws can do, one needs only to look abroad. In the past decade,
analogous legislation has been adopted in a number of countries,
including Russia and Hungary, where it has often been used to
stigmatize and marginalize civil society.28 This has forced many

24. See id. § 611(c)(1)(ii); id. § 611(h).
25. Id. § 611(c)(1); see also infra Part II.C (describing the principal–agent relationship under
FARA).
26. See infra Part II.E (describing exemptions to FARA).
27. See infra Part II.F (describing why nonprofits, media organizations, and public officials
are particularly susceptible to falling under the requirements of FARA).
28. See INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., FARA’S DOUBLE LIFE ABROAD 1 (Nov.
2017), https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/FARA-briefing_Final_c.pdf [https://perma.cc/

ROBINSON IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

1082

1/16/2020 11:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1075

nonprofits in countries like Russia to either shut down or dramatically
alter their operations.29 In defending their legislation, the governments
of these countries have frequently pointed to FARA for justification
and legitimacy.30 Although there are important differences between
FARA and these other acts, these extraterritorial examples are
troubling. They both show how FARA has had an outsized negative
influence on democracy elsewhere and serve as a warning for how
FARA could be used to target dissent in the United States in the
future.
Indeed, history indicates that when enforcement of FARA has
strengthened, the government has used the Act to target dissenting
voices. For example, W.E.B. Du Bois, the noted early civil rights
leader, was prosecuted for failure to register under FARA in 1951
when he reprinted and circulated antinuclear literature and petitions
that had originated abroad. These materials were viewed by some as
undermining U.S. foreign policy.31 More recently, in 2018, the
chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee investigated
four prominent U.S. environmental groups, including the Natural
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), as potential “foreign agents”
based on these organizations’ cross-border connections and criticisms
of U.S. environmental policy.32
Meanwhile, the targeting of RT TV America and Sputnik under
the Act has raised questions about why other media organizations that
seemingly fall under FARA’s purview have not been similarly asked to
register.33 It has also highlighted how registration under FARA can

WC86-6MR3] (explaining that it is common for governments to use these laws to “constrain[]
civil society and dissent,” especially targeting groups that receive international funding).
29. Id. (saying, for example, that thirty groups in Russia shut down rather than register as
foreign agents).
30. Id. at 1–2 (providing examples of how FARA has been used to justify foreign-agent
legislation in other countries).
31. For a brief description of these events, see Andrew Lanham, When W.E.B. Du Bois Was
Un-American, BOS. REV. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/race-politics/andrew-lanhamwhen-w-e-b-du-bois-was-un-american [http://perma.cc/7MXE-JA6A].
32. For a description of this investigation, see Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Republicans
Want To Know if Environmental Groups Are Really Foreign Agents, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2018/09/06/the-energy
-202-republicans-want-to-know-if-environmental-groups-are-really-foreign-agents/5b9007281b3
26b3f31919f99 [https://perma.cc/Q7EJ-7ZD6].
33. See Alexandra Ellerbeck & Avi Asher-Shapiro, Everything To Know About FARA, and
Why It Shouldn’t Be Used Against the Press, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 11, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/fara-press.php [https://perma.cc/G2QA-N22Q] (“FARA experts
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have secondary effects beyond transparency. For example, RT TV
America’s Capitol Hill press credentials were revoked after it
registered, and companies that Sputnik did business with in the United
States were asked to register under the Act as well, creating substantial
barriers just to broadcast in the United States.34
FARA’s overbreadth not only can lead to politicized targeting but
can also create confusion about who should register. This uncertainty
can chill transnational cooperation, as nonprofits, media outlets, and
others may avoid a broad range of cross-border relationships that could
potentially make them vulnerable to being tarred as a “foreign agent.”
FARA’s overbreadth also arguably makes key provisions of the Act
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s emerging First
Amendment jurisprudence,35 casting even more uncertainty over
FARA’s enforcement.
To address the negative consequences of the Act’s vague and
sweeping provisions, this Article argues that FARA’s statutory
language should be amended to better define what “foreign influence”
the Act is meant to target. Too often, FARA is seen as a tool to combat,
or make transparent, very different kinds of foreign influence, whether
this is lobbying, electioneering activity, or disinformation. However,
not all of these different types of influence raise the same concerns nor
is the bluntness of FARA very effective at addressing them. At the
same time, the Act treats a broad spectrum of foreign connections the
same. For example, one is equally an “agent” under FARA whether
one is under contract with a foreign government or simply acting at the
“request” of a small international nonprofit.36 In short, FARA must
more clearly identify the specific types of “influence” and “foreign”
connections that it is meant to target.
worry that, the way the law is written, it doesn’t draw clear distinctions that set apart the BBCs of
the world from outlets that overtly mix propaganda and journalism.”).
34. Id. (discussing how RT TV America’s Capitol Hill press credentials were revoked);
Casey Michel, A New Lawsuit Claims that Companies Helping Russian Propaganda in the U.S.
Aren’t All Foreign Agents, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/us-company-working-with-russian-propaganda-outlet-fights-foreign-agent-status-in-new-lawsuitc5ea15f642c4 [https://perma.cc/L85T-69L4] (discussing a legal challenge by RM Broadcasting to
registering under FARA for providing commercial services to Sputnik).
35. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First
Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 686 (2011) (suggesting that restrictions that chill
the speech of certain categories of speakers, like FARA does, would face significant scrutiny after
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
36. See infra Part II.B & Part II.C (describing that both foreign governments and nonprofits
are considered foreign principals under FARA and that acting at a foreign principal’s “request”
can create an agency relationship under the Act).
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To guide this reform, this Article posits that FARA, and other
disclosure tools directed at foreign influence, are most appropriate, and
on strongest ground, when applied to (1) those who clearly are acting
at the direction or control of a foreign government or political party;
or (2) when the covered activity involves core democratic processes
aimed at directly influencing the government, such as lobbying or
electioneering. This Article warns that using FARA to target
disinformation is generally unlikely to be effective and presents a
substantial risk of politicized abuse.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the spread of
laws analogous to FARA in other countries and how these laws were
justified, at least in part, by reference to FARA itself. It then discusses
how these supposed transparency measures can be weaponized to
target civil society. Part II undertakes an analysis of the text of FARA
to show how the Act’s broad and vague provisions can capture the
activities of a far-reaching set of nonprofits, media organizations, and
public officials, creating confusion and a fertile environment for the
politicized enforcement of the Act. Part III uses three examples to
show how FARA’s enforcement has been politicized in the past and
examines why increased enforcement in the future will likely lead to
further politicization of the Act. Part IV explains how key provisions
of FARA are so broad they arguably violate the First Amendment or
are unconstitutionally vague. Part V turns to FARA reform, assessing
the merits of using the Act to address foreign lobbying, electioneering
activity, and disinformation and suggesting three possible reform
strategies.
I. FARA’S GLOBAL INFLUENCE
According to Freedom House, over the past decade, countries
around the world have, on average, seen a decline in political and civil
liberties, including restrictive regulations on nonprofits.37 One of the
most widespread types of restriction has been on foreign funding of

37. From 2006 to 2017, the Freedom in the World survey has found more countries have seen
declines in political and civil liberties than gains. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD:
IN
CRISIS
8
(2018),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
DEMOCRACY
FH_FITW_Report_2018 Final_SinglePage.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ZJ-LUCB]. On the rise in
laws and regulations of nonprofits globally, see Michael Schuman, An Increasingly Uncivil World,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 31, 2017, 10:37 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/articles/2017-07-31/growing-number-of-countries-are-clamping-down-on-civil-societygroups [https://perma.cc/BL6J-3ETC].
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nonprofits, including through “foreign agent” laws.38 Governments
have repeatedly used such restrictions as a tool to control, delegitimize,
or undercut nonprofits.39
Several of these “foreign agent” laws in other countries have been
justified in part by citing to FARA for precedent.40 In the 1990s and
2000s, the United States was well known for exporting the Freedom of
Information Act to other countries, leading to many countries adopting
similar laws.41 Today, the United States has turned to inadvertently—
and sometimes purposefully—exporting FARA.42
However, there are key differences between these “foreign agent”
laws in other countries and FARA. For one thing, FARA is broader: it
is not targeted just at nonprofits but instead extends to any individual
or entity engaged in a covered activity.43 FARA is also not focused
specifically on foreign funding.44 Perhaps most importantly, the
political context is significantly different between the United States
and some of these other countries. In the United States, the openness

38. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Globalization Without a Safety Net: The Challenge of
Protecting Cross-Border Funding of NGOs, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1205 (2018) (detailing how over
fifty countries have increased restrictions on domestic nongovernment organizations receiving
funding from outside their home country); Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of
Philanthropic Protectionism, 17 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 5–20 (2015) (describing the rise of
restrictions on foreign funding of nonprofits globally).
39. Rutzen, supra note 38, at 12–13 (describing how “foreign agent” laws in the former Soviet
Union have been used to stigmatize nonprofits). Doug Rutzen documents at least ten different
types of mechanisms that governments have used to control foreign funding. These include
requiring prior government approval for an organization to receive international funding—such
as in India—caps on international funding—as in Ethiopia—or burdensome reporting
requirements—like in Turkey. Id. at 6–16.
40. See KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 14 (2013) (discussing
different pathways documented in the literature by which foreign models influence domestic law,
including via emulation of high status countries).
41. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2017) [hereinafter Pozen, Freedom of Information] (“FOIA has
become one of the United States’ leading legal exports abroad.”).
42. See infra Part I.A. Although the U.S. government did not actively export FARA to
Russia or Hungary, it did so with Australia. See AUSTRL. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE AND SEC., ADVISORY REPORT ON THE FOREIGN INFLUENCE TRANSPARENCY
SCHEME BILL 2017,
at
35
(2018),
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/
committees/reportjnt/024192/toc_pdf/AdvisoryReportontheForeignInfluenceTransparencySche
meBill2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/29ZF-5HRL] (describing close consultations with the U.S.
Justice Department in drafting the Australian bill).
43. See infra Part II.B (describing covered activities under FARA).
44. See id. (describing covered activities, none of which reference foreign funding).
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of political discourse has led to more limited enforcement of FARA
than its text would allow.45
This Part briefly examines the rise of analogous laws to FARA in
other countries, focusing on Russia and Hungary as examples where
these types of laws have been used to target nonprofits. It then
discusses the recent passage of similar laws in two historical
democracies: Israel and Australia. This Part finally situates these
“foreign agent” laws as examples of a broader phenomenon in which
transparency measures are “weaponized” to target civil society.
A. “Foreign Agent” Type Laws in Other Countries
Russia and Hungary provide prominent examples of how laws
analogous to FARA have been used to restrict civil society. In Russia,
the government passed a law in 2012 that required nonprofits that
receive any foreign funding and engage in broadly defined “political
activity” to register as “foreign agents.”46 Failure to register can lead to
fines, jail time, and other penalties.47
In Russia, registering as a “foreign agent” carries a stigmatizing
label. Perhaps most poignantly, “foreign agent” is closely associated
with “spy” in Russian.48 Human rights groups like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have detailed how many
nonprofits have chosen either to shut down or to stop receiving foreign
funding—and thereby dramatically curtail their operations—instead of

45. NICK ROBINSON, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., LEGAL AND REGULATORY
CHALLENGES FACING CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4 (2018),
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Legal-and-Regulatory-Change-in-U.S.-(2-20).pdf?_ga=
2.56079147.1254041628.1577571517-1632587217.1577571517&_gl=1*1h0zz5p*_ga*MTYzMjU4N
zIxNy4xNTc3NTcxNTE3 [https://perma.cc/22CU-ST8D] (noting that the U.S. has a vibrant civil
society and a regulatory environment that has generally been open to international civil-society
organizations).
46. AMNESTY INT’L, AGENTS OF THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS OF “FOREIGN AGENTS” LAW
IN RUSSIA: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOCIETY 4 (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/
download/Documents/EUR4651472016ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/X299-7G8K].
47. Daria Skibo, Five Years of Russia’s Foreign Agent Law, OPENDEMOCRACY (Aug. 14,
2017),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/five-years-of-russia-s-foreign-agent-law/
[https://perma.cc/5ACN-CRPZ] (noting that failure to register can be punished with two years in
jail, fines, and community work).
48. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 31; Michael Abramowitz & Nate Schenkkan, How
AFF.
(Apr.
6,
2018),
Illiberal
Leaders
Attack
Civil
Society,
FOREIGN
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2018-04-06/how-illiberal-leaders-attackcivil-society [https://perma.cc/7L4K-8VJG].
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registering under Russia’s law.49 The Russian government has also
prosecuted leaders of nonprofits, such as human rights groups, for
allegedly not complying with the law.50
Russia’s foreign-agent law has been heavily criticized. Notably, in
responding to such criticism, Russia has repeatedly claimed that it is
designed to achieve the same purposes as FARA.51 Further, in 2017,
after RT TV America and Sputnik were asked to register as “foreign
agents” in the United States under FARA, the Russian government
reciprocated by passing a law that allowed it to designate foreignfunded media organizations in Russia as “foreign agents.”52 Russia has
designated Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, among others,
as agents under the law, and in some cases, it has issued fines for
noncompliance.53
In a similar vein, Hungary’s parliament passed a law in 2017
entitled the “Law on the Transparency of Organizations Funded from
Abroad,”54 which requires organizations that receive more than a
certain amount in foreign funding to register as “foreign-supported” or
else face closure by the Hungarian government.55 Hungary has
responded to criticisms from the U.S. Department of State regarding
its transparency law by claiming it is similar to FARA and that the
United States was applying a double standard.56

49. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 14; Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (June 18, 2018, 5:30 AM) [hereinafter HRW], https://www.hrw.org/russia-governmentagainst-rights-groups-battle-chronicle [https://perma.cc/HBX8-SPGS].
50. HRW, supra note 49.
51. See, e.g., Charles Digges, Russia To Answer for Its ‘Foreign Agent’ Law in European
Court of Human Rights, BELLONA (Oct. 5, 2017), http://bellona.org/news/ russian-human-rightsissues/russian-ngo-law/2017-10-russia-to-answer-for-its-foreign-agent-law-in-european-court-ofhuman-rights [https://perma.cc/2YKC-4JJ9] (noting that FARA has been “a favorite trope” of
the Russian Ministry of Justice in defending their law).
52. Russia Declares Nine US Media Outlets ‘Foreign Agents,’ BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42234582 [https://perma.cc/4NZD-A4S7].
53. Max Greenwood, Russian Court Fines US-Funded Outlets for Violating Foreign Agents
Laws, HILL (July 5, 2018, 3:06 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/media/395655-russia-courtfines-us-funded-outlets-for-violating-foreign-agents-laws [https://perma.cc/GF78-8WNW].
54. Hungary: Ngo Law a Vicious and Calculated Assault on Civil Society, AMNESTY INT’L
(June 13, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/hungary-ngo-law-a-vicious-andcalculated-assault-on-civil-society [https://perma.cc/K86Q-5BHM].
55. Yasmeen Serhan, Hungary’s Anti-Foreign NGO Law, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121
[https://perma.cc/F2WC-GS79].
56. Pablo Gorondi, Hungary Rejects US Criticism of Law on Foreign-Funded NGOs, AP
NEWS (June 20, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/1722c34b948447bba1d9a42dec3c8f88
[https://perma.cc/9EUP-9LSS].
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Both the Russian and Hungarian laws on foreign funding of
nonprofits have been challenged in international forums.57 In 2014, the
Venice Commission found the Russian statute violated the freedom of
association. The Commission ruled that labeling organizations that
received foreign funding as “foreign agents” is not necessary to assure
financial transparency in a democracy and that this practice unfairly
stirs “suspicion and distrust” of these entities, which could chill their
activity.58 Similarly, in June 2017, the Venice Commission found that
Hungary’s draft law on foreign funding raised questions about whether
it violated Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) because of the “virulent campaign” by some public officials
to portray organizations that receive foreign funding “as acting against
the interests of society.”59 After the law was enacted, the European
Commission referred the Hungarian law to the Court of Justice of the
European Union.60 The Commission determined that the law
“indirectly discriminate[d against] and disproportionately restrict[ed]
donations from abroad to civil society organisations” by placing
administrative burdens on the recipient.61 It further found that these
burdens were “liable to have a stigmatising effect on both recipients
and donors.”62
“Foreign agent” laws have also spread to historical democracies
like Israel and Australia. In 2016, Israel enacted legislation that
required groups that received more than half their funding from
57. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association has noted that “stigmatizing or delegitimizing the work of foreign-funded CSOs by
requiring them to be labeled as ‘foreign agents’ or other pejorative terms” is “problematic” under
international law. Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly & of Ass’n), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Ass’n, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc A/HRC/23/39 (Apr. 24, 2013).
58. VENICE COMM’N, OPINION ON FEDERAL LAW N. 121-FZ ON NON-COMMERCIAL
ORGANISATIONS (“LAW OF FOREIGN AGENTS”) ON FEDERAL LAWS N. 18-FZ AND N. 147-FZ
AND ON FEDERAL LAW N. 190-FZ ON MAKING AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE (“LAW
ON
TREASON”) OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 14
(June
13–14,
2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2014)025-e [https://
perma.cc/U7NA-SF2A].
59. VENICE COMM’N, PRELIMINARY OPINION ON THE DRAFT LAW ON THE
TRANSPARENCY OF ORGANISATIONS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM ABROAD 16 (June 2, 2017),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2017)002-e [https://perma.cc/
JQ6R-7378].
60. Id.
61. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5003, Infringements -European Commission
Refers Hungary to the Court of Justice for Its NGO Law (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5003_en.htm [https://perma.cc/RNZ9-BN6C].
62. Id.
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foreign governments to report this information in their
communications with the public.63 According to Israel’s Justice
Ministry at the time, the law would cover twenty-five groups, most of
which were critical of the government in power, including human rights
organizations as well as research and advocacy groups associated with
the political opposition.64 In discussing an earlier version of the bill,
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman argued, in part to justify the bill,
that it was a “direct translation” of FARA.65
In 2018, Australia enacted the Foreign Influence Transparency
Scheme Act (“FITS Act”).66 The Australian government consulted
heavily with the U.S. Department of Justice when drafting the bill,67
and the Australian Prime Minister referred to the bill as an “improved
version” of FARA.68 In its advisory report in June 2018, the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
frequently made provision-by-provision comparisons of the bill to
FARA.69 Like FARA, the FITS Act potentially requires a broad set of
actors to register under the law if they are engaged in covered
activities.70
A wide cross-section of Australian nonprofits, universities, and
legal professionals came out strongly against the legislation, viewing it
as a direct threat to civil society and free speech and fearing it would

63. Peter Beaumont, Israel Passes Law To Force NGOs To Reveal Foreign Funding,
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016, 4:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israelpasses-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding [https://perma.cc/C4D5-AF98].
64. Israel: Law Targets Human Rights Groups, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 13, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/israel-law-targets-human-rights-groups [https://perma.cc/
HJ7Q-XSZK].
65. ACRI to Foreign Minister: Description of Foreign Funding Bill Is Misleading, ASS’N FOR
C.R. ISRAEL (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.acri.org.il/en/2011/11/27/acri-to-foreign-ministerdescription-of-foreign-funding-bill-is-misleading [https://perma.cc/Y3U6-KBLN].
66. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Austl.).
67. See sources cited supra note 42.
68. Cat Barker, Deirdre McKeown, & Jaan Murphy, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme
Bill 2017 and Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (Charges Imposition) Bill 2017, in
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY BILLS DIGEST 9 (Bills Digest No. 87, 2018–18, 2018),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/billsdgs/5849247/upload_binary/584924
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/J37V-9ZPQ].
69. AUSTRL. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND SEC., supra note 42,
at 39–40 (noting that the report makes provision by provision comparisons throughout to FARA).
70. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 pt 2 (Austl.). (explaining that the bill
required anyone engaged in covered activities to register).
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limit civil society’s ability to engage across borders.71 As a result of this
and other criticism, the original bill was significantly amended,72
notably by adding an exemption for many activities of nonprofits and
by substantially narrowing who is defined as a “foreign principal.”73
B. The Weaponization of Transparency
Governments frequently invoke the need for transparency and
accountability when passing “foreign agent” type laws. For example,
both Hungary and Australia’s laws have “transparency” in their title,
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified Israel’s “foreign
agent” law because it will “increase transparency” and “strengthen
democracy,”74 and advocates for Russia’s 2012 “foreign agent” law
justified it to the public by claiming “[y]ou have the right to know who
is trying to influence your opinion.”75 Facially, such transparency
arguments are logical, but as the examples in this Section
demonstrate—particularly from Russia and Hungary—transparency
measures can be weaponized against civil society. In particular,
burdensome disclosure requirements and stigmatizing labels can be
used to target dissent.
Though transparency measures are frequently vital to good
government, their use is ultimately a political tool that can empower
certain actors over others. There is a growing recognition in the
literature that statutes aimed at creating more transparency in
71. See Paul Karp, Fear ‘Rushed’ Foreign Influence Bill Will Harm Freedom of Speech,
(Jan.
22,
2018,
9:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/australiaGUARDIAN
news/2018/jan/23/fear-rushed-foreign-influence-bill-will-harm-freedom-of-speech [https://
perma.cc/4KHF-9MMW] (noting the opposition of Australian universities and legal groups to the
draft foreign transparency bill); Wendy Williams, How Do Australia’s Foreign Interference Laws
Compare to Draconian States?, PRO BONO AUSTRL. (Mar. 29, 2018, 8:55 AM),
https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2018/03/australias-foreign-interference-laws-comparedraconian-states [https://perma.cc/EEM5-KA3N] (describing opposition to the foreign
transparency bill from a coalition of nonprofits called Hands Off Our Charities).
72. Paul Karp, Charities, Unions and Arts Bodies Win Reprieve from Foreign Influence
Register, GUARDIAN, (June 25, 2018, 2:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2018/jun/25/charities-unions-and-arts-bodies-win-reprieve-from-foreign-influence-register
[https://perma.cc/6FTR-P5LQ] (noting amendments for exemptions for run-of-the-mill
representations made in accordance with the organization’s purpose).
73. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 10–11 (limiting foreign principals to a
foreign government, foreign government related entity, foreign political organization, or foreign
government related individual); id. at 32–33 (creating a limited exemption for charities).
74. Beaumont, supra note 63.
75. Miriam Elder, Russia Plans To Register ‘Foreign Agent’ NGOs, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2012,
8:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/02/russia-register-foreign-agent-ngos
[https://perma.cc/7EDU-JBBN].
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government can sometimes disproportionately assist those with more
resources to undermine the functioning of government to their
advantage.76 For example, when these statutes allow corporations to
flood administrative agencies with transparency requests, corporations
are able to consume agency resources and potentially find technical
violations of procedure on which to challenge regulation.77 Similarly,
transparency tools may inadvertently, but unfairly, cast more
scrutiny—and derision—on civilian government than on national
security agencies or the military, which often do not face the same
disclosure requirements.78 This can unjustly empower the latter in
relation to the former.
Concerns about inadvertently empowering certain actors over
others are particularly acute when transparency measures are targeted
at civil society.79 For example, legislation in India was passed in 2013
that requires those managing certain nonprofit organizations to
disclose their personal assets.80 In Ukraine, a similar measure was
passed in 2017 that requires management of certain nonprofits and
some investigative journalists to disclose their personal assets.81 Such
measures create scrutiny and compliance burdens on certain active

76. See generally David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018)
(describing how transparency has shifted to being seen as tool to make government smaller and
less egregious, in part through corporate capture of freedom of information laws).
77. Id.
78. See Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 41, at 1112–36 (arguing that the Freedom
of Information Act has contributed to a culture of derision surrounding domestic policy
bureaucracy while insulating national security agencies and corporations from similar scrutiny);
see also Nick Robinson & Nawreen Sattar, When Corruption Is an Emergency: “Good
Governance” Coups and Bangladesh, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 737 (2012) (describing how
anticorruption campaigns directed at civilian government can inadvertently empower militaries
in countries with histories of military coups such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand).
79. HANS GUTBROD, DISTRACT, DIVIDE, DETACH: USING TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY TO JUSTIFY REGULATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2017)
(summarizing how transparency measures can be used to restrict civil society).
80. Liz Mathew & Manoj C G, Asset Disclosure by Govt Staff, NGOs: Deadline Extended
EXPRESS
(July
28,
2016,
12:51
PM),
Indefinitely,
INDIAN
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/asset-disclosure-government-staff-ngodeadline-extended-modi-2939653 [perma.cc/V37P-ZTKQ] (describing the 2013 Lokpal Act that
requires senior management of nonprofits that receive government grants or foreign funding to
disclose their assets).
81. Melinda Haring, Presidential Administration Says Law Requiring Activists To Disclose
Assets Is Invalid and Unenforceable, but Ukraine’s Activists Aren’t Buying It, KHARKIV HUM.
RTS. PROTECTION GROUP (Apr. 17, 2018), http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1523912040
[https://perma.cc/32ST-RSTZ] (describing 2017 legislation that requires management of
anticorruption nonprofits and some investigative journalists to disclose assets).
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members of civil society that can undermine their ability to hold
government accountable.82
“Foreign agent” laws are similarly not aimed at government but
rather target nonstate actors such as nonprofits, the media, and others.
As such, there is arguably increased danger that they will be used to
undermine those who criticize the government or hold controversial
views. Nonstate actors generally have fewer resources to comply with
these regulations or to combat political opponents who use these laws
to create misleading narratives.
The next Part turns to the United States to examine the text of
FARA itself. It shows how FARA’s broad provisions can be read to
require a wide range of actors to register under the Act’s often
burdensome and stigmatizing disclosure and labeling requirements. In
particular, many nonprofits, media organizations, and public officials
are likely to engage in activity covered by the Act, thus making them
particularly vulnerable to selective and politicized enforcement.
II. FARA’S BREADTH AND VAGUENESS
This Part analyzes FARA’s breadth and vagueness. It begins by
briefly describing the historical evolution of the Act. It then examines
in more detail the definitions of a “foreign principal,” covered activity,
and the agency relationship in the current version of the Act, as well as
briefly discussing FARA’s reporting requirements and exemptions.
Establishing the scope of FARA’s key provisions makes clear why a
broad swath of nonprofits, media organizations, and public officials
arguably need to register and why they are more vulnerable to
enforcement, including politicized enforcement, than other actors,
such as multinational companies.
A. Historical Evolution of FARA
FARA83 had its genesis in the recommendations of a special
committee to investigate “un-American” activities appointed by the
82. The enforcement of these provisions in both laws is currently suspended. Id.; Mathew &
C G, supra note 80.
83. When referring to the “Foreign Agents Registration Act,” this Article is referencing only
22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2018). Another part of the federal code, 18 U.S.C. § 951 (2018), requires
an “agent of a foreign government” to notify the Attorney General if they act “within the U.S.
subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official” and do not fall under an
exemption. Id. § 951(d). Some recent prominent charges have also been brought under 18 U.S.C.
§ 951 against alleged Chinese and Russian agents. See, e.g., Matthew Kahn, Document: Justice
Department Charges Russian National for Conspiracy To Act as a Foreign Agent, LAWFARE (July
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73rd Congress.84 This committee was chaired by Representative John
McCormack, who would later become Speaker of the House.85 It
conducted an investigation and held hearings throughout 193486 and
ultimately released a report in 1935 that found evidence of persons in
the United States spreading fascist and communist propaganda on
behalf of foreign governments and political parties.87
This concern with propaganda was representative of the era. The
1920s and 1930s saw immense debate among U.S. academics and
policymakers about how to address propaganda in a democracy,
particularly from domestic outlets backed by industrialists. Walter
Lippman famously argued during this period that to respond to
propaganda, the government should support a technocratic army of
experts to filter information for both the public and their
representatives and that government should make clear the interests
behind propaganda.88
Perhaps drawing on Lippman’s call for creating more
transparency around propaganda, the McCormack Report
recommended that Congress enact a law requiring all “publicity,

16, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-justice-department-charges-russiannational-conspiracy-act-foreign-agent [https://perma.cc/Q4ZV-5ZJQ] (outlining the criminal
complaint against a Russian national, Mariia Butina, for being an unregistered “foreign agent”);
Sophia Yan, US Arrests Chinese ‘Spy Recruit’ as Ties Deteriorate Further Between Beijing and
Washington, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2018/09/26/us-arrests-chinese-spy-recruit-ties-deteriorate-beijing-washington [https://
perma.cc/ZQ2H-4T3H] (describing the arrest of a Chinese “spy recruit” under FARA). The
Justice Department also provides a list of “other federal statutes aimed at persons loosely called
foreign agents.” DOJ ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 4.
84. JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10499, FOREIGN AGENTS
REGISTRATION ACT: AN OVERVIEW (Mar. 7, 2019).
85. Richard L. Lyons, Ex-House Speaker John McCormack Dies, WASH. POST (Nov. 23,
1980),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/11/23/ex-house-speaker-johnmccormack-dies/a866f94f-df9b-4719-b7af-6cad9717c1b3/?utm_term= [https://perma.cc/HV48QLY5].
86. See H.R. REP. NO. 74-153, at 1–2 (1935) (describing the authority and work of the
committee).
87. Id. at 22.
88. See WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 103 (1993) (“No ordinary bystander is
equipped to analyze the propaganda by which a private interest seeks to associate itself with the
disinterested public.”); id. at 102 (“Thus the genius of any illuminating public discussion is not to
obscure and censor private interest but to help it to sail and to make it sail under its own colors.”).
John Dewey also found, like Lippmann, that there had been an “unprecedented” increase in the
use of propaganda. However, he disagreed that the answer lay in a heavy government role in
managing national debate. Instead, he argued the proper response was citizens debating issues at
a local level and that experts should focus on uncovering facts for the public to help them navigate
the new media landscape. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 182, 203–19 (1946).
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propaganda, or public-relations agents . . . [representing] any foreign
government or a foreign political party or foreign industrial or
commercial organization” to register with the federal government.89
Based on the Report, Representative McCormack introduced what
would become the Foreign Agents Registration Act.90 The proposed
legislation would not ban speech outright. Rather, as a report of the
House Judiciary Committee claimed in 1937, the idea was to let “the
spotlight of pitiless publicity . . . serve as a deterrent to the spread of
pernicious propaganda.”91 In 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration
Act was signed into law.92
FARA’s current reputation for being notoriously vague and
sweeping93 should perhaps not be surprising given its historical context.
The law was initially passed while the United States was ramping up
for World War II. To respond to this looming threat, it provided the
89. H.R. REP. NO. 74-153, at 23. The McCormack Committee Report also made
recommendations that Congress make it unlawful for a person to advocate for the violent
overthrow of the U.S. government, which helped result in the creation of two other key internal
security statutes: the Voorhis Act and the Smith Act. See id. at 24. The Voorhis Act required
registration of certain organizations subject to foreign control that advocated the violent
overthrow of the U.S. government. Act of Oct. 17, 1940 (Voorhis Act), Pub. L. No. 76-870, 54
Stat. 1201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (2018)). The Smith Act, among other
measures, created criminal penalties for anyone who advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S.
government. Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 760 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2018)). In 1950, the McCarran Act was passed, adding to these
internal-security disclosure statutes, as it required Communist organizations to register with the
Justice Department. Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran Act), Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat.
987 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 781 (2018)). The Supreme Court eventually struck—or
read—down key uses of the Smith and McCarran Acts. See Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965) (finding the McCarran Act’s requirement that members of the
Communist Party register with the government unconstitutional); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 327 (1957) (finding that the First Amendment only allowed the Smith Act to apply when
there was advocacy for action to overthrow the government and noting that such cases would be
“few and far between”).
90. H.R. 1591, 75th Cong. (1937).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937).
92. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2018)).
93. See, e.g., Robert Kelner, Brian D. Smith, Zachary G. Parks & Derek Lawlor, The Foreign
Agents Registration Act (“FARA”): A Guide for the Perplexed, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/foreign-agents-registration-act-fara-guide-perplexed
[https://perma.cc/DJ6X-ZGEN] (claiming that the triggers for registration under FARA are
“extremely broad” and that as a result, “FARA practitioners often assume that some of the
triggers cannot mean what they say”); Taking Stock of Newly Released FARA Advisory Opinions,
PERKINS COIE (June 18, 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/taking-stock-ofnewly-released-fara-advisory-opinions.html [https://perma.cc/H6CC-KZSX] (commenting that
FARA has a “broad statutory sweep, notoriously ambiguous definitions and [a] dearth of caselaw
or other precedent available to help interpret its application”).
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government a wide net to capture the propaganda of adversaries.
While FARA was celebrated at the time as a more “democratic” and
civil-liberties-protective method of fighting totalitarian propaganda
than criminalizing seditious speech,94 it still had a suppressive effect. In
the run-up to and during World War II, FARA was successfully used
to help silence many of the most active pro-Nazi voices in the United
States through prosecutions, investigations, and demanding
registration requirements.95 As Brett Gary has noted in his history of
the federal government’s efforts to fight propaganda during this
period, “FARA gave the Justice Department an effective and lowprofile means for eliminating unwanted political ideas from the U.S.
scene without drawing critical attention to its work.”96
FARA has been amended a number of times, including major
amendments in 1942, 1966, and 1995.97 Particularly in recent years, the
Justice Department has relied largely on voluntary compliance and has
rarely prosecuted FARA cases.98 As a result, courts have not had the
opportunity to flesh out the meaning of many of the Act’s provisions.
Indeed, the very purpose of FARA continues to be unsettled. The
Act was initially designed to combat foreign propaganda,99 but this goal
fell out of favor in the 1950s amidst the abuses of FARA in the

94. Inst. of Living Law, Combatting Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Exposure, 10
U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 107–08, 138 (1943) (describing disclosure laws like FARA as a “democratic
way[] of defending democracy” and commenting that they have been administered so as not to
“interfere with the civil liberties of any one”); see BRETT GARY, THE NERVOUS LIBERALS:
PROPAGANDA ANXIETIES FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE COLD WAR 195 (1999) (discussing how
registration and disclosure requirements were seen as “democracy-enhancing techniques” and
“led speech-protective liberals to support this form of propaganda control”).
95. DOJ ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 4 (noting that FARA was used in the World
War II era to successfully prosecute twenty-three criminal cases); GARY, supra note 94, at 210–
11, 214–15 (describing that during the World War II period some 7,600 individuals and
organizations registered under the Act, providing the Justice Department with vast amounts of
information).
96. GARY, supra note 94, at 215–16; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet
Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
22 (1991) (“In the years before World War II, . . . . [t]he ‘spotlight of pitiless publicity’ directed
through the lenses of the Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act
was thought to provide a mechanism for suppressing antidemocratic propaganda without
overstepping the bounds of the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).
97. See, e.g., Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691; Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966); Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248 (1942).
98. See supra note 4 (noting that between 1966 and 2015 there were only seven criminal cases
and seventeen civil cases brought by the Justice Department under FARA).
99. IG FARA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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McCarthy era.100 The 1966 amendments to FARA shifted the focus of
the Act to shedding light on lobbyists and others attempting to
influence U.S. government decision-making for foreign interests,
particularly on economic matters.101 Nevertheless, the Act never lost
key provisions that can be used to require registration of a much
broader range of actors. The Justice Department’s recent requests to
Russian and Chinese media organizations to register under FARA
may signal that enforcement of the Act is again turning toward those
attempting to influence U.S. public opinion more generally.
As of the end of 2017, there were 411 entities or persons
representing 612 foreign principals registered under the Act.102 Those
registered were mostly providing lobbying, public relations, legal,
consulting, or tourism-promotion services for foreign governments.103
There were also groups registered that support political parties or
candidates abroad104 and a handful of media organizations linked
closely to foreign governments.105
Under its current incarnation, FARA’s registration requirements
follow a relatively simple, if broad and vaguely worded, formula: agents
of a “foreign principal” engaged in covered activities, who do not meet
any of FARA’s exemptions, must register with the Justice
100. See infra Part III.A (discussing the prosecution of W.E.B. Du Bois).
101. United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1073–74 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Over the years,
FARA’s focus has gradually shifted from Congress’ original concern about the political
propagandist or subversive seeking to overthrow the Government to the now familiar situation
of lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations consultants pursuing the less radical goal of
‘influenc[ing] [Government] policies to the staisfaction [sic] of [their] particular client.’”
(alterations in original) (footnote omitted)).
102. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED,
FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2017, at 2 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/nsdfara/page/file/1085771/download [https://perma.cc/RJ68-DLZX].
103. See id. (listing the nature of the services provided by each registrant); see also Anna
Massoglia & Geoff West, Foreign Interests Have Spent over $530 Million Influencing US Policy,
Public Opinion Since 2017, OPENSECRETS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2018/08/foreign-interests-fara-lobby-watch-exclusive [https://perma.cc/DNK3-S9DM]
(providing a breakdown of the largest foreign principals and agents by money spent).
104. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Registration Statement of All Pakistan Muslim
League LLC (Feb. 15, 2011), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6019-Registration-Statement-201102151.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9W6-HLJW] (describing the activities of the All Pakistan Muslim
League LLC as “support[ing] the principles and the mission of the All Pakistan Muslim League,
a political party organized in Pakistan”). See generally, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102,
(listing such registrants).
105. Ellerbeck & Asher-Schapiro, supra note 33 (noting that “a few media outlets are
registered,” including China Daily, South Korea’s KBS America, and Japan’s NHK
Cosmomedia).
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Department.106 Once registered, these “foreign agents” must meet a set
of disclosure requirements, including making a conspicuous statement
on covered informational material that they are acting on behalf of a
foreign principal. Willful failure to register or making false statements
or omissions in connection with registration carries a punishment of up
to $10,000 or five years in jail.107 The rest of this Part examines the key
terms in the Act in more detail and articulates why nonprofits, media
organizations, and public officials are particularly susceptible to
needing to register.
B. Foreign Principal and Covered Activities
Under FARA, a “foreign principal” includes: a foreign
government or political party; any entity organized under the laws of a
foreign country or having its principal place of business there; or any
person outside the United States, unless they are a domiciled U.S.
citizen.108 This expansive definition means a broad range of actors fall
under the definition of “foreign principal,” including corporations,
nonprofits, foundations, media organizations, and most persons based
outside of the United States.
Covered activities under FARA include: (1) engaging in “political
activities for or in the interests” of a foreign principal; (2) soliciting or
disbursing “things of value” for or in the interests of a foreign principal;
(3) acting as a publicity agent, public-relations counsel, informationservice employee, or political consultant for or in the interests of a
foreign principal; or (4) representing “the interests of [a] . . . foreign
principal before any agency or official of the government of the United
States.”109
Although there are a number of covered activities in FARA, the
term “political activities” is among the most expansive. It is defined as:
any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the
person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the
Government of the United States or any section of the public within
the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing
106. 22 U.S.C. § 611 (2018).
107. Id. § 618(a). The Justice Department can also seek injunctive relief to stop someone from
continuing to commit any activities that are violating FARA. Id. § 618(f). In Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Supreme Court held that willfulness in the context of a
registration program requires “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability
of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply.” Id. at 229.
108. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b).
109. Id. § 611(c)(1)(i)–(iv).
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the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference
to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a
government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.110

In other words, “political activities” includes not just lobbying
U.S. government officials, but, arguably, it covers almost any advocacy
efforts that engage with the public. It also seemingly includes most
reporting by journalists, if the journalist “influence[s]” U.S. public
opinion on a policy issue, even if it is just through factual reporting to
create a more informed debate.
While the breadth of “political activities” in FARA is striking,
other covered activities are also expansive. For instance, being a
“political consultant” is defined to mean any person “informing or
advising any other person with reference to the domestic or foreign
policies of the United States” or the policies of a foreign country.111
Significantly, a number of covered activities do not have to be political
in nature to trigger coverage under the Act.112 For example, soliciting
or disbursing anything of value is a covered activity under the Act.113
Meanwhile, a “publicity agent” is defined as someone disseminating
any oral, visual, or written information of any kind for or in the interest
of a foreign principal.114 Acting as an “information-service employee”
is another covered activity. Information-service employee is defined
with an absurdly broad ambit as:
any person who is engaged in furnishing, disseminating, or publishing
accounts, descriptions, information, or data with respect to the
political, industrial, employment, economic, social, cultural, or other
benefits, advantages, facts, or conditions of any country other than

110. Id. § 611(o) (emphasis added). The Justice Department’s regulations further define the
term “domestic or foreign policies of the United States” as to “relate to existing and proposed
legislation, or legislative action generally; treaties; executive agreements, proclamations, and
orders; decisions relating to or affecting departmental or agency policy, and the like.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 5.100(f) (2018).
111. 22 U.S.C. § 611(p).
112. Kelner et al., supra note 93 (noting that “DOJ has in the past sometimes read the
definition of ‘political activities’ into other triggers; for example concluding that one could not be
acting as a ‘political consultant’ for FARA purposes unless one was also engaging in political
activities, as defined in the statute,” but “[i]n recent interactions with the FARA Unit . . . staff
have called into question the validity of such prior guidance”).
113. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(iii).
114. Id. § 611(h) (“The term ‘publicity agent’ includes any person who engages directly or
indirectly in the publication or dissemination of oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial
information of matter of any kind, including publication by means of advertising, books,
periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or otherwise . . . .”).
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the United States or of any government of a foreign country or of a
foreign political party or of a partnership, association, corporation,
organization, or other combination of individuals organized under the
laws of, or having its principal place of business in, a foreign country
. . . .115

In other words, providing someone in the United States with a
weather report from Bali on behalf of a foreign principal would
seemingly make one an “information-service employee,” since the
weather report involves the “conditions” of another country.
To be clear, for any of these activities above to be considered a
covered activity for the purposes of FARA, they must be undertaken
“for or in the interests” of a foreign principal.116 However, the Act does
not define this phrase. It could be interpreted narrowly—for instance,
the activity has to be explicitly on behalf of the foreign principal—or
liberally—the activity merely has to be indirectly beneficial to the
foreign principal. The next Section addresses these issues as it
considers what it means to act as an “agent of a foreign principal”
under FARA.
C. Principal–Agent Relationship
The definition of who is an “agent of a foreign principal” is one of
the most controversial and confusing aspects of FARA. The principal–
agent relationship in FARA is much broader than how principal–agent
relationships are traditionally defined. For instance, under the current
Restatement of Agency, an agent and his or her principal must agree
that the agent will act on the behalf of, and be subject to the control of,
the principal.117 Under FARA, that “agency” relationship is much
wider and more ambiguous. An “agent” is defined under the Act as:
any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant,
or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or
under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person
any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed,
controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a

115. Id. § 611(i).
116. See id. § 611(c)(1)(i)–(iii) (noting that each covered activity must be “for or in the
interests of such foreign principal”).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
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foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person
[engages in covered activities in the Act.]118

This is a convoluted definition. However, it is important to note
that it is in fact defining both who is an “agent” and who is an
intermediary of a foreign principal. An agent is a person who is an
“agent, representative, employee, or servant” of a foreign principal or
their intermediary, or a person who acts at the “order, request, or
under the direction or control” of a foreign principal or their
intermediary.119 An intermediary, in turn, is a person “whose activities
are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or
subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.”120
Notably, under the text of the Act, someone can become an agent
by simply acting at a foreign principal’s “request.”121 Furthermore, a
person can become an intermediary by merely being financed or
subsidized in “major part” by a foreign principal.122 Neither “request”
nor “major part” is defined further in the Act or its regulations. The
implication of these provisions is that a person can become an agent or
an intermediary of a foreign principal without consenting to such
designation. Similarly, a foreign principal does not have to consent to
someone acting as their “agent” and, in fact, may not even know that
someone is their “agent.”
1. Request. A key question regarding FARA is how to interpret
“request” in the Act’s definition of the agency relationship. The word
“request” has only been directly interpreted once by the federal courts
in Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Committee.123 In that case,
the Justice Department claimed the Irish Northern Aid Committee was
an “agent” of the Irish Republican Army under FARA.124 The Irish
Northern Aid Committee argued that the agency requirement in
FARA should be interpreted to be the same as the Restatement of
Agency definition. 125 However, this approach was rejected by both the
Southern District of New York and on appeal by the Second Circuit.
118. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 668 F.2d
159 (2d Cir. 1982).
124. Id. at 246–47.
125. Id. at 256.
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Both courts found it was sufficient to establish agency if an individual
or entity acts simply at a foreign principal’s “request.”126
What “request” means is ambiguous, however. The Second
Circuit found that the “exact perimeters of a ‘request’ under the Act
are difficult to locate, falling somewhere between a command and a
plea”127 and should be interpreted through the lens of the “informative
purposes of the Act.”128 The court noted, for example, that an
unspecified plea by the Italian government to the Italian American
community to send aid to earthquake victims would not make
individual Americans “agents” under FARA if they responded.129
Contrarily, if a foreign principal asked identifiable individuals to act,
these persons may be fairly viewed as “in some way authorized to act
for or to represent the foreign principal.”130 The Second Circuit
continued: “Once a foreign principal establishes a particular course of
conduct to be followed, those who respond to its ‘request’ for
complying action may properly be found to be agents under the Act.”131
This interpretation by the Second Circuit is itself confusing and
would allow a broad range of activity to create an agency relationship.
For example, as absurd as it may sound, if a relative living abroad—a
“foreign principal”—asked an American family member to transport a
birthday gift back to a sibling in the United States, and if that family
member complied with the request, the American relative would
seemingly be an “agent of a foreign principal” and need to register
under FARA as she would be engaged in covered activity by disbursing
something of value for a foreign principal and following through on a
“particular course of conduct” requested by the foreign relative.132

126. Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the
district court decision and noting that FARA agency’s definition is not the same as the
Restatement’s with its focus on “control”); Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. at 257 (explaining
that the plaintiff does not have to show “that defendant is an ‘agent,’ in the Restatement sense, or
a ‘person who acts in any other capacity . . . under the direction or control’ of the IRA; it is
sufficient to establish agency under the Act that defendant is a ‘representative’ of the IRA, or
acts at its ‘request.’” (omission in original) (footnote omitted)).
127. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d at 161.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 161.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 162.
132. In the 1940s, the Institute of Living Law noted with concern how FARA might
inadvertently capture cross-border loans within a family. Inst. of Living Law, supra note 94, at
120. Congress has not rectified this problem.
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2. Subsidized in Whole or in Major Part. Another point of
contention in defining the agency relationship in FARA has involved
how to interpret when an intermediary is “subsidized in whole or in
major part” by a foreign principal.
First, it is not clear what amount of foreign-principal subsidization
would constitute a “major part” of funding. Members of Congress have
proposed clarifying this definition. For example, in 1991, legislation
was introduced, but did not pass, that would have added a provision
that a foreign principal would control a person in “major part” if they
held “more than 50 percent equitable ownership in such person or,
subject to rebuttal evidence, if the foreign principal held at least 20
percent” equitable ownership.133
Second, the relationship between funding and the creation of an
agency relationship has been filled with confusion. In the only case
discussing the issue, Attorney General of the United States v. Irish
People, Inc.,134 the D.C. Circuit, drawing on a House Judiciary report,
found that when Congress amended FARA in 1966, it meant to make
clear that the mere receipt of a subsidy should not require the recipient
to register as a “foreign agent.”135 Instead, the subsidy has to be part of
creating direction or control of the foreign principal over the
recipient.136 However, the House report seems to be confusing the
situation. Under the text of FARA, subsidization has nothing to do
with creating a relationship between a foreign principal and an agent.
Instead, someone who receives money from a foreign principal can
become an intermediary who can subsequently create an agency
relationship between the foreign principal and other actors. For
example, if a U.S. nonprofit working on human trafficking is subsidized
133. H.R. 1725, 102d Cong. (1991).
134. Attorney Gen. v. Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
135. Id. at 524. Judges Scalia, Bork & Gesell noted that when Congress amended the
definition of agent in 1996, they made clear that FARA “should not require the registration ‘of
persons who are not, in fact, agents of foreign principals but whose acts may incidentally be of
benefit to foreign interests, even though such acts are part of the normal course of those persons’
own rights of free speech, petition or assembly.’” Id. They continued, “[m]oreover, ‘mere receipt
of a bona fide subsidy not subjecting the recipient to the direction or control of the donor does
not require the recipient of the subsidy to register as an agent of the donor.’” Id. (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 89-1470, at 5–6 (1966)); see also Michele Amoruso E Figli v. Fisheries Dev. Corp., 499
F. Supp. 1074, 1081–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a corporation was not an agent under FARA
despite receiving financial support from a foreign principal, noting that the corporation was not
subject to the foreign government’s control, even though the corporation’s lobbying efforts
benefited that entity).
136. See Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d at 524 (holding that mere financial subsidization of Irish
People does not create an agency relationship).
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in “major part” by a grant from a United Kingdom foundation with an
antitrafficking mandate, the U.S. nonprofit would be considered an
intermediary of the U.K. foundation. If the nonprofit then directed or
requested that a partner organization, also in the United States, help
publicize a report it had written using funding from the U.K.
foundation on how to best stop human trafficking, and if the partner
organization does so, then it would also seem to need to register. Under
FARA’s text, the U.K. foundation does not itself even have to make a
“request” to the U.S. nonprofit or its partner organization for this
agency relationship to be created. It could simply finance the U.S.
nonprofit, who then requests their partner to engage in a covered
activity that is in the interests of the U.K. foundation.
The difference between the text of the Act and its legislative
history, as recounted by the D.C. Circuit, is hard to explain. This lack
of clarity further highlights the confusion around how an agency
relationship is even created under FARA.
D. Registration and Reporting Requirements
The reporting requirements under FARA are extensive.137 Agents
must provide a long list of information including home addresses of
officers and directors of an entity, the organization’s bylaws, and the
covered activities undertaken by the foreign agent.138 Registration
materials are available to the public on the Justice Department’s
website.139 Significantly, all covered informational materials under the
Act distributed by the foreign agent must include “a conspicuous
statement that the materials are distributed by the agent on behalf of
the foreign principal, and that additional information is on file with the
Department of Justice.”140 Requiring a conspicuous statement that
material is distributed on behalf of a foreign principal can be

137. Individuals or entities covered by FARA must register with the Justice Department
within ten days of undertaking covered activity and follow up with periodic reports on covered
activity. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)–(b) (2018). Individuals engaged in covered activity working for a
registered entity must also complete a separate short-form registration. 28 C.F.R. § 5.202 (2018).
However, the Attorney General may exempt individuals from short-form registration if not
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. 22 U.S.C. § 612(f).
138. Id. § 612(a)–(b).
139. FARA Quick Search, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://efile.fara.gov/ords/
f?p=185:1:0::::P1_DISPLAY [https://perma.cc/5YAJ-6VBC].
140. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b).
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stigmatizing and implies that the registered “agent” is not acting
independently but on behalf of a foreign interest.141
Despite FARA’s extensive reporting requirements, there is a long
history of complaints, both that those who should register do not and
that those who do register do not follow the reporting requirements.142
This has helped lead to the recent calls to strengthen enforcement of
the Act.
E. Exemptions
Given the broad definitions of foreign principal, covered activities,
and who is an “agent” under FARA, it would seem that an almost
endless number of persons and entities would need to register. FARA
contains a number of exemptions to registering, however.143 These
exemptions are significant and help exclude many of the activities of
businesses, academics, religious institutions, lawyers, and others that
might otherwise be covered. Although facially broad, these exemptions
are frequently ambiguous and, as will be shown, do far less to exempt
activities of nonprofits, media organizations, and public officials.
1. Diplomatic or National Security Exemptions and Commercial
Exemptions. To address the need for foreign governments to have
official representatives in the United States, there are a set of
“diplomatic” exemptions for diplomatic staff and officials of foreign
governments recognized by the Department of State.144 The Attorney
General, at the request of the Secretary of State, may also exempt an
agent of a foreign government from registering whose defense the
president determines is vital to the United States.145
141. See, e.g., Kate Ackley, Companies, Nonprofits Put Brakes on Foreign Lobbying Bills,
ROLL CALL (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/companiesnonprofits-put-brakes-foreign-lobbying-bills [https://perma.cc/4P3W-BRBV] (noting that
companies want to avoid the stigma of registering under FARA); Ellerbeck & Asher-Schapiro,
supra note 33 (claiming that registration under FARA has a stigmatizing and punitive effect for
media).
142. See, e.g., IG FARA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7–21 (finding deficiencies in identifying
FARA registrants and in their registration and noting earlier General Accountability Office
Reports from 1974, 1980, and 1990 that made similar complaints about the enforcement of
FARA).
143. The primary exemptions to registration to FARA are provided in 22 U.S.C. § 613.
144. Id. § 613(a)–(c).
145. Id. § 613(f). Since it was included in FARA in 1942, this exemption has never been used.
Letter from Heather H. Hunt, Chief, Registration Unit, Counterespionage Section, Nat’l Sec.
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to [addressee deleted] (May 18, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/nsdfara/page/file/1038216/download [https://perma.cc/2ANR-ZLVW].

ROBINSON IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/16/2020 11:43 PM

THE WEAPONIZATION OF TRANSPARENCY

1105

A commercial exemption applies to agents of foreign principals
engaged in “private and nonpolitical” activity that furthers “the bona
fide trade or commerce of [a] foreign principal.”146 This is a significant
exemption for the business community, as otherwise a broad swath of
business activity would fall under FARA’s registration requirements.
However, this exemption, and the requirement that commercial
activity be “private and nonpolitical,” has at times generated
confusion, in particular with regard to the commercial activities of
foreign governments or state-owned companies.147 To help clarify, the
Justice Department issued regulations stating that even if a foreign
principal is owned or controlled by a foreign government, its actions
will be considered “private” as long as they do not “directly promote
the public or political interest of [a] foreign government.”148
Still, the Justice Department has often had a limited interpretation
of what is “private and nonpolitical.” For example, it has indicated that
a public-relations firm hired by a foreign government to promote
tourism to the country must register under FARA because tourism
fosters economic development, which is in the public and political
interests of a country’s government.149
146. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(1).
147. For instance, the Justice Department found in an advisory opinion that a consulting firm
for a foreign, state-owned bank needed to register when undertaking educational outreach to U.S.
financial institutions because doing so would promote the public interest of a foreign country.
Letter from Heather H. Hunt, Chief, FARA Registration Unit, Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice,
to
[addressee
deleted]
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/nsdfara/page/file/1068636/download [https://perma.cc/3HHX-T4JK]. However, another advisory
opinion found that a public-relations firm working for a foreign embassy did not have to register
for introducing a foreign government official to private industry leaders in the “defense and
cybersecurity markets” because these were “private and non-political activities.” Letter from
[name deleted], Senior Trial Attorney, FARA Registration Unit, Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice,
to
[addressee
deleted]
(Dec.
21,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/nsdfara/page/file/1036096/download [https://perma.cc/4Z4W-5NM7]. It is not obvious why being
introduced to defense industry leaders is less “in the political interest” of a foreign government
than educational outreach to U.S. financial institutions.
148. 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(b) states:
For the purpose of section 3(d) of the Act, activities of an agent of a foreign principal
as defined in section 1(c) of the Act, in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce
of such foreign principal, shall be considered ‘private,’ even though the foreign
principal is owned or controlled by a foreign government, so long as the activities do
not directly promote the public or political interests of the foreign government.
28 C.F.R. § 5.304(b) (2018).
149. Letter from Joseph E. Clarkson, Chief, Registration Unit, Internal Sec. Section, Criminal
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to [addressee deleted] (Jan. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion
1984], https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1046156/download [https://perma.cc/34EDRCSK] (“Promoting tourism on behalf of [foreign government] through advertisements cannot
be construed as private and nonpolitical activities.” (alteration in original)).
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2. Religious, Academic, Fine Arts, or Humanitarian Exemptions.
Of particular importance to nonprofits, FARA also provides an
exemption for “bona fide religious, scholastic, academic, or scientific
pursuits or of the fine arts.”150 However, this provision has been
interpreted by the Justice Department not to apply to persons engaged
in “political activities” defined under the Act.151 It is not obvious how
the Justice Department generates this distinction from the text of
FARA; perhaps it does not consider religious or academic activity of a
“political” nature to be “bona fide.” Under such a broad reading, a
Catholic priest in the United States who, at the request of the Pope,
calls for peace between all countries in his weekly sermon would
seemingly be required to register under FARA as he would be
attempting to influence U.S. public opinion on a policy issue at the
request of a foreign principal. Similarly, a U.S. professor who arranges
a public talk at a university at the request of a colleague from France
who wishes to discuss his new book on how to improve transatlantic
trade relations may also have to register. In both cases, the “foreign
agent”—the priest or the professor—is arguably acting at the request
of a foreign principal to engage in “political activities.”152
FARA’s “humanitarian” exemption applies to those “soliciting or
collecting . . . contributions within the United States to be used only for
medical aid and assistance, or for food and clothing to relieve human
suffering.”153 This exemption does not include the solicitation of funds
in the United States meant for other humanitarian purposes, such as
for housing or education, or for the disbursement of any humanitarian
funds in the United States. As such, a nonprofit in the United States
soliciting funds for building a school at the request of a partner
organization in Central America would seemingly need to register
under FARA. Similarly, an employee of a foreign foundation
disbursing funds in the United States for hurricane relief would also
seemingly fit under the Act’s registration requirements.
3. Lobbyists and Lawyers. There is a partial exemption for
lobbyists under FARA. The Act was amended in 1995, when the

150. 22 U.S.C. § 613(e).
151. 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(d) (“The exemption provided by section 3(e) of the Act shall not be
available to any person described therein if he engages in political activities as defined in . . . the
Act for or in the interests of his foreign principal.”).
152. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(i).
153. Id. § 613(d)(3).
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Lobbying Disclosure Act (“LDA”) was enacted,154 so that agents of
foreign individuals or entities who register under the LDA would be
exempt from also having to register under FARA for the same
lobbying activity.155 However, lobbyists for foreign governments or
political parties still have to register under the more extensive and
burdensome requirements of FARA regardless of whether they are
registered under the LDA.156 Furthermore, Justice Department
regulations make clear that even if one’s client is not a foreign
government or political party, one must still register under the Act if
the principal beneficiary of the lobbying is a foreign government or
political party.157
Notably, while the LDA has a de minimis exemption,158 FARA
does not.159 In other words, if one does any amount of lobbying for a
foreign government or political party, one needs to register with the
Justice Department as a “foreign agent.”160
FARA also includes an exemption for lawyers representing a
foreign principal before a court of law or agency of the U.S
government, so long as the individual is part of an official proceeding
or inquiry.161 However, lawyers still must register if they attempt to

154. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 & 22 U.S.C. §§ 611, 621 (2018)).
155. 22 U.S.C. § 613(h) (exempting from FARA registration “[a]ny agent [under the Act who
is not an agent of a foreign government or political party] if the agent has engaged in lobbying
activities and has registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 in connection with the
agent’s representation of such person or entity.” (citation omitted)).
156. See id. (excluding agents of foreign principals under § 611(b)(1)—foreign governments
and political parties—from the lobbying exemption).
157. 28 C.F.R. § 5.307 (“In no case where a foreign government or foreign political party is
the principal beneficiary will the exemption . . . be recognized.”).
158. See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10) (2018) (defining “lobbyist” under the LDA to exclude an
individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the services provided to a
client over a three-month period).
159. 22 U.S.C. § 613 (providing exemptions under FARA, none of which is a de minimis
exemption).
160. Observers have noted that the LDA exemption creates a potential loophole for escaping
registration under FARA. Registering under the LDA seemingly provides an exemption to
registering not just for lobbying activities but also for any covered activities under FARA. In
other words, even if one is an “information-service employee” or “political consultant” for a
foreign principal—both activities covered under FARA—one does not need to register under the
Act if one is registered under the LDA. H.R. REP. No. 104-339, at 29 (1995) (noting that 1995
FARA amendments would exempt many agents of foreign principals from registration under
FARA if they were registered under the LDA).
161. 22 U.S.C. § 613(g).
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“influence” officials outside an agency or judicial proceeding or a legal
investigation.162
4. “Other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest.”
Perhaps the least clear exemption in FARA is § 613(d)(2), which is also
perhaps the most significant exemption that could be applied to
nonprofits, the media, and public officials, among others. It provides
an exemption for “other activities not serving predominantly a foreign
interest.”163 Although the Justice Department has provided little
interpretation of this exemption,164 there are at least three ways to
interpret its language.
First, the provision could be read on its face. Under this
interpretation, if any activity otherwise covered under the Act does not
serve “predominantly a foreign interest,” one does not have to register.
This plain reading still generates ambiguity. For example, consider a
Canadian nonprofit that “requests” a Chicago nonprofit host a public
event on the Canadian nonprofit’s report on how best to combat the
opioid epidemic. In this scenario, who has the “predominant interest”
in the Chicago nonprofit setting up the event? Certainly, the Canadian
nonprofit has an interest, but is it predominant? The Chicago nonprofit
might also want this public-health information spread in the United
States; would its interest be “predominant”? In short, reading
§ 613(d)(2) on its face could still lead to confusion, even if it would limit
who must register.
Second, § 613(d)(2) could be interpreted to only apply to those
engaged in commerce. It states an exemption for “other activities not
serving predominantly a foreign interest,” but it is not clear what
“other” refers to. Directly above § 613(d)(2), in § 613(d)(1), is the
exemption for private and nonpolitical commercial activity.165
Structurally, then, § 613(d)(2) could be read as an exemption for “other
[commercial] activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest.”
Under such a reading, commercial activities would not require
registration even if they were “political” or “public,” as long as they do
not “serv[e] predominantly a foreign interest.”
162. Id.
163. Id. § 613(d)(2).
164. The Justice Department’s FAQ page does not even mention the exemption in
§ 613(d)(2). See General FARA Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/general-fara-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/
73DD-ALDM].
165. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
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This reading of the provision also seems partially supported by
legislative history. When § 613(d)(2) was added in 1966, § 1(q), which
has since been removed,166 was also added to clarify the provision.167
Section 1(q) stated that those with substantial U.S. commercial
operations would not be deemed to be engaging in activities “serving
predominantly a foreign interest” just because those activities
benefited someone in another country, as long as the entity in question
was not controlled, supervised, or financed by a foreign government or
political party.168 This amendment was added to ensure that agents of
multinational companies with substantial business in the United States
would not have to register when contacting government officials just
because such an interaction might benefit a foreign subsidiary or a
foreign parent company.169 As such, § 613(d)(2) today could be
interpreted to mean that commercial actors do not need to register if
they engage in public or political activity as long as that activity does
not directly promote the interest of a foreign government or political
party.170 Under this interpretation, however, this exemption would
presumably not apply to nonprofits, public officials, or other
noncommercial actors.171

166. In 1995, when the LDA was passed and amendments were made to FARA, the focus of
Congress was primarily on the lobbying aspects of FARA. S. REP. NO. 103-37, at 1–2 (1993).
There had been complaints that having to determine whether a foreign company had a substantial
business interest in the U.S. was confusing. Id. at 38–39. Congress decided it would be better to
treat all lobbyists of foreign and domestic companies the same, whether or not they had a
substantial business interest in the United States. Id. at 10, 38. As such, § 1(q) was removed as a
seemingly unnecessary exemption, and the LDA exemption was added, allowing all lobbyists,
except those of foreign governments or political parties, to register under the LDA and not
FARA. Id. at 52.
167. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1470, at 7 (1966) (noting that § 1(q) “clarifies the meaning of ‘activities
not serving predominantly a foreign interest’”).
168. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244,
245 (1966) (adding § 1(q) as an amendment to FARA).
169. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1470, at 10–11 (noting that § 1(q) was added to address concerns that
the Act could otherwise be interpreted as requiring agents of international corporations to
register for their routine activity with government).
170. Today, the only Justice Department regulation related to § 613(d)(2) reads very similarly
to § 1(q) and only references the exemption applying to commercial actors. Like in § 1(q),
“foreign interest” is narrowed to mean an interest of “a foreign government or of a foreign
political party.” 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(c) (2018).
171. This interpretation of § 613(d)(2) as only being an extension of the commercial
exemption in § 613(d)(1) may also be supported by a recent advisory opinion. Letter from
Heather H. Hunt, Chief, FARA Registration Unit, Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
[addressee deleted] (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1112151/download
[https://perma.cc/F7R5-2XPM] (describing the commercial exemption as applying to anyone
covered by § 613(d)(1)–(2)).
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Finally, there is a third way of interpreting § 613(d)(2). Following
the interpretation of § 613(d)(2) informed by § 1(q), today’s exemption
could be read as “in other activities not serving predominantly [the
interest of a foreign government or of a foreign political party].” Under
this broader reading, § 613(d)(2)’s exemption, interpreted through the
lens of § 1(q), would apply not just to commercial actors but also to any
actor covered by the Act.172 This would mean that the Chicago
nonprofit in the example above would likely not need to register, as its
action is not benefitting the Canadian government, even if it might be
benefitting a Canadian nonprofit. This would substantially narrow
what activity is covered under FARA, even if in some situations
determining what activity is in the interest of a foreign government or
political party would still be ambiguous.
5. “Bona Fide” Domestic Media. Finally, there is a long and
confusingly written provision that exempts a news service or
publication in the United States from registering if it is engaged in:
[B]ona fide news or journalistic activities, . . . so long as it is at least
80 per centum beneficially owned by, and its officers and directors, if
any, are citizens of the United States, and [such a news organization]
is not owned, directed, supervised, controlled, subsidized, or financed,
and none of its policies are determined by any foreign principal . . . or
[their agent].173

Some have pointed to this “bona fide” journalistic-activity
exemption as a reason why some high-profile foreign-based media
organizations like the BBC, or their employees, do not have to
register.174 However, even a cursory reading shows the exemption
would apply in very limited contexts. Putting aside the difficulty of

172. Lending support to this interpretation, a House Judiciary Committee report explained
that as a result of the 1995 amendments, “FARA is limited to agents of foreign governments and
political parties. Lobbyists of foreign corporations, partnerships, associations, and individuals are
required to register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, where applicable, but not under FARA.”
H.R. REP. NO. 104-339, at 21 (1995). Although the focus in these amendments was on lobbying,
this first sentence still seems to imply that Congress viewed the FARA as applying only to agents
of foreign governments or political parties.
173. 22 U.S.C. § 611(d) (2018) (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Tracy Wilkinson & Joseph Tanfani, FBI Investigates Russian
Government Media Organizations Accused of Spreading Propaganda in U.S., L.A. TIMES (Sept.
13, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-russia-propaganda-20170913-story.html
[https://perma.cc/45JK-E6KS] (claiming that FARA provides an exemption for “any news or
press service”—the language of 22 U.S.C. § 611(d)—as long as “its coverage is not directed by a
foreign government”).
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having to determine what is “bona fide” journalistic activity, few media
organizations that would otherwise be covered would have only U.S.
officers or directors and not be directed, financed, or subsidized by a
foreign principal. Consider, for instance, The Wall Street Journal. If it
was determined that The Wall Street Journal needed to register because
a journalist or editor acted at the request of a foreign principal, this
exemption would likely not apply because News Corp, which owns The
Wall Street Journal, is financed in part by foreigners and has foreigners
among its officers and directors.175 The same would likely be true of
many media organizations operating in the United States.
F. Actors Particularly Vulnerable to Politicized Enforcement
Despite the hodgepodge of exemptions in FARA, a large number
of actors are still covered by the Act. Rather than survey all of those
potentially covered under FARA, this Section focuses on three types
of actors—nonprofits, media organizations, and public officials—
whose work may frequently be covered by the Act and who, because
of their often controversial stances, may be particularly vulnerable to
its politicized enforcement.
1. Nonprofits. Nonprofit organizations are especially susceptible
to being required to register under FARA because, almost by
definition, their work does not generally qualify for the Act’s
commercial exemption.176 Nonprofit or philanthropic work frequently
involves covered activities that are in the interest of a foreign principal,
like “soliciting” or “disbursing” funds;177 “political activities,” such as
advocacy;178 or publishing materials on information related to a foreign
country.179

175. See Board of Directors, NEWS CORP, https://newscorp.com/corporate-governance/boardof-directors [https://perma.cc/2DG4-HWEC] (listing José María Aznar, the former president of
Spain, as one member of the News Corp Board of Directors). News Corp is a publicly traded
company that foreigners can buy shares in. See NEWS CORP, ANNUAL REPORT 2018,
https://newscorpcom.files.wordpress.com/2018/09/news-corp-2018-annual-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X8NG-6N8N].
176. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(1) (creating an exemption for “private and nonpolitical activities in
furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of [a] foreign principal”). Most nonprofit activity
cannot be considered in furtherance of “trade or commerce.”
177. See id. § 611(c)(1)(iii) (listing such activity as covered under FARA).
178. See id. § 611(c)(1)(i) (listing engaging in “political activities” as a covered activity under
FARA).
179. See id. § 611(c)(1)(ii) (listing acting as an “information-service employee” as a covered
activity under FARA).
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Some examples help illustrate how the routine and beneficial work
of many nonprofits might require registration. Consider an
international nonprofit headquartered in London that focuses on
promoting transparency. The London transparency organization
would be a “foreign principal” under FARA. As such, if the
organization has employees in the United States engaged in advocating
for stronger transparency laws, those employees are arguably engaged
in “political activity” for a foreign principal and so would need to
register.180 Similarly, if the London nonprofit had an affiliated U.S.
branch, that branch would arguably need to register, even if the U.S.
branch is organized completely under U.S. law. This is because the U.S.
branch may act at the “request” of the international headquarters in
London in a manner that affects U.S. public opinion on a policy issue.
By the same logic, a partner nonprofit, based entirely in the United
States and not formally connected to the London organization, may
still need to register if it attempts to influence U.S. public opinion at
the “request” of the London nonprofit. This might occur, for instance,
if the U.S. nonprofit organized a public meeting in the United States at
the request of the London nonprofit where the London nonprofit
released a report on the benefits of transparency.
As already discussed, the FARA exemptions for religious or
academic institutions only apply to “bona fide” religious or academic
activities, which do not include “political activities.”181 As such, an
aggressive FARA enforcement policy would also raise significant
questions about whether many religious and academic institutions, and
their employees, may need to register for activity that could be broadly
construed as “political.” Similarly, the humanitarian exemption does
not exempt foreign organizations disbursing funds in the United States
or domestic organizations soliciting funds for foreign partners working
on issues like education or women’s rights.182
The broad wording of FARA, and its limited exemptions, risks
deterring nonprofits’ work in the United States. In fact, this chilling
effect may already be taking place. In 2016, the Inspector General’s
report on FARA’s implementation explicitly called for greater powers
to investigate nonprofits, universities, and think tanks for FARA

180. See id. § 611(c)(1)(i).
181. See supra Part II.E.2.
182. See supra Part II.E.2.
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violations.183 As detailed more in Part III, some nonprofits have
already been targeted using the Act for seemingly ideological or
partisan reasons.
2. Media. It is perhaps not surprising that the provisions of FARA,
if read on their face, would seem to require many media organizations
and journalists to register, given that the Act was originally drafted as
an antipropaganda measure. Furthermore, many current media actors
are arguably more globalized than their predecessors were when
FARA was written, making them more likely to be covered under the
Act.
The commercial exemption of FARA applies to “private and
nonpolitical activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or
commerce of [a] foreign principal.”184 As such, the exemption
seemingly does not apply to journalistic activities because coverage of
or opinions about political events would likely be considered “political
activity” under FARA.185
Further, many media organizations are arguably covered by the
broad definition of “publicity agent,” which is defined as disseminating
any oral, visual, or written information of any kind for or in the interest
of a foreign principal.186 Similarly, media organizations, or their staff,
would be considered “information-service employee[s]” if they
disseminate information on foreign countries or foreign corporations
or organizations in the interest of a foreign principal.187
Such a broad interpretation of covered activities arguably captures
many foreign-based news organizations that publish or broadcast in the

183. IG FARA REPORT, supra note 1, at 18–19 (advocating for providing the Justice
Department with civil investigative demand authority to better to investigate nonprofits,
organizations at universities, think tanks, and others).
184. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(1).
185. See Advisory Opinion 1984, supra note 149 (noting, in the context of finding that tourist
advertising for a foreign government requires registration, the Justice Department found that
“[t]he dissemination of political propaganda automatically precludes a commercial exemption”).
186. 22 U.S.C. § 611(h).
187. Id. § 611(i). Indeed, the Justice Department asked RT TV America to register for
engaging in all three of these covered activities. See infra Part III.C.
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United States, like the BBC188 or The Guardian.189 It would also capture
some media organizations that are based in the United States but have
some foreign ownership, foreign offices, or foreign partners, meaning
that they may at times act at the “request” of or be financed in “major
part” by a foreign principal.
Even non-news media outlets may be covered. For instance, if
PBS or Netflix replay Downton Abbey or The Great British Bake Off
under a contract with the BBC, they might be considered either an
“information-service employee”—because they are arguably
broadcasting shows that describe the “conditions” of a foreign
country190—or a “publicity agent”—because they are distributing
visual information for or in the interest of a foreign principal.191
Similarly, a Hollywood producer that distributes a Chinese-made film
casting China in a positive light could potentially be viewed as a
“publicity agent” or “information-service employee.” The commercial
exemption could potentially apply to these activities, but only if they
are considered commercial and nonpolitical. As noted earlier,
however, the Justice Department has found even tourism promotion
to be “political.”192 Thus, it is unclear whether forms of soft power like
The Great British Bake Off or a film that showcases China in a positive
light could appropriately claim exemption as commercial enterprises.
The lack of clarity about these definitional categories only highlights
how FARA creates confusion and is susceptible to politicized
enforcement.
188. BBC America broadcasts in the United States, but it is majority owned by BBC
Worldwide and must meet the BBC’s editorial standards. Katherine Rushton, BBC America Now
Almost Half-Owned by US Cable Company AMC, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2014, 12:16 AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/11184252/BBC
-America-now-almost-half-owned-by-US-cable-company-AMC.html
[https://perma.cc/CXS6CMNL]. The U.S. office of the BBC registered under FARA as late as 1986. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED,
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1986, at 259 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 FARA REPORT],
https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/991806/download [https://perma.cc/N23X-NBY9]
(listing records of FARA registration). It is not clear why it stopped registering.
189. The Guardian has an online U.S. edition, but Guardian News & Media is based in the
United Kingdom. Who Owns the Guardian? Our Unique Independent Structure, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 17, 2017, 11:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/about/2017/nov/17/who-owns-theguardian-our-unique-independent-structure [https://perma.cc/R9KH-BXG6].
190. 22 U.S.C. § 611(i). Indeed, until at least 1986, some national public radio stations
registered under FARA for marketing BBC content. See 1986 FARA REPORT, supra note 188,
at 252 (disclosing the registration of Minnesota Public Radio for marketing BBC programs).
191. 22 U.S.C. § 611(h).
192. Advisory Opinion 1984, supra note 149.
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3. Public officials. FARA also seemingly requires many public
officials—including members of Congress, congressional staff, and
members of the executive branch—to register if they act at the
“request” of a foreign individual, company, or governments in a
manner that is covered by the Act—a fact that is often overlooked by
most commentators. U.S. public officials are not explicitly exempt from
registering under FARA. In fact, any public official who registers as a
“foreign agent” under FARA faces not only embarrassment but also
up to two years of imprisonment.193
In 1980, Philip Heymann, then Assistant Attorney General,
testified before Congress that part of the reason the Justice
Department did not then rely on the term “request” in FARA’s agency
requirement in its enforcement decisions was to avoid officials being
ensnared in the Act’s framework.194 As Heymann noted, if “request”
included simple forms of persuasion, then a member of Congress who
was on a trip to Turkey who (1) was asked by Turkish government
officials to promote policies favorable to Turkey and (2) subsequently
supported these policies when he returned to Congress, would then
become an unregistered “foreign agent” of the Turkish officials.195
Similarly, if a Canadian corporation requested that a member of
Congress arrange a meeting of policymakers in her constituency to
discuss the local business climate in consideration of building a factory,
the congresswoman arguably would need to register under FARA,
since the convening of local policymakers would be designed to
influence a “section of the public . . . with reference to formulating” the
domestic policies of the United States.196
Perhaps recognizing this problem of overbreadth, when Australia
adopted its transparency legislation in 2018, which was heavily

193. 18 U.S.C. § 219 (2018).
194. Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya: Hearing Before the Subcomm. To
Investigate the Activities of Individuals Representing the Interests of Foreign Gov’ts, of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 701 (1980) (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Att’y
Gen.).
195. Former Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann explained:
Because of possible results like this one, we do not read or apply the statute to instances
of persuasion or the mere urging of a viewpoint. Instead, . . . . [a]s we read the
statute . . . a person is a foreign agent, and must register with the Department, if he
engages in the activities specified in the statute and if he does so at the order of a foreign
principal, or under the direction or control of a foreign principal.
Id.
196. 22 U.S.C. § 611(o) (defining “political activities”).
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modeled on FARA, one of the key changes the Australian Parliament
made was to add an exemption for statutory officeholders.197
Although the Justice Department has traditionally interpreted
FARA narrowly as it applies to public officials, a future Justice
Department might not be so deferential. Or FARA could be used by
others in a politicized manner. For instance, in September 2018,
President Donald Trump tweeted that former Secretary of State John
Kerry may have violated FARA by meeting with the Iranian
government and offering them advice related to the United States.198
Senator Marco Rubio then sent a letter to the Justice Department
asking it to investigate whether Kerry violated either FARA or the
Logan Act.199 In a climate of increased enforcement, U.S. politicians
could more regularly use the wide and malleable language of FARA as
a weapon against political opponents.
III. THE POLITICIZED ENFORCEMENT OF FARA
While there has long been criticism that FARA is underenforced,
its actual use has been littered with accusations of politically motivated
targeting. This Part examines three such examples: the Justice
Department’s prosecution of W.E.B. Du Bois and other officers of the
Peace Information Center in the early 1950s; the investigation by the
chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee in 2018 of four
prominent U.S. environmental nonprofits; and the Justice
Department’s request that RT TV America register under FARA in
2017.
Though such politicized uses of FARA have been relatively rare
in recent decades—in large part because the Act is so rarely enforced—
these instances show how FARA might be used more aggressively in
the future. For instance, the scholar Grant Smith has been critical that
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”), and
particularly its precursor organization the American Zionist Council,

197. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 pt. 2.25A (Austl.) (providing a limited
exemption for members of the Parliament of Australia and statutory office holders).
198. William Cummings, Trump, Pompeo Denounce Ex-Secretary of State John Kerry for
(Sept.
14,
2018,
4:21
PM),
Meetings
with
Iranians,
USA
TODAY
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/14/trump-pompeo-attack-kerry-iranmeetings/1306311002 [https://perma.cc/XWX6-K39P].
199. Rubio Letter, supra note 17. The Logan Act bars unauthorized U.S. citizens from
negotiating with foreign governments over disputes with the U.S. government. Daniel J. Hemel
& Eric A. Posner, The Logan Act and Its Limits, LAWFARE (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:07 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/logan-act-and-its-limits [https://perma.cc/KLB9-JDRF].
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were not required by the Justice Department to register.200 At the same
time, the Kashmiri American Council, an organization Smith claims
had a similar relationship to a foreign government, was criminally
prosecuted under the Act.201 Smith complains that “FARA
enforcement was never intended to be ‘optional’ or used as a political
cudgel against an administration’s perceived enemies.”202
FARA has also been used to justify other legal measures that have
undercut legitimate cross-border exchanges. Most notably, in the 1940s
and 1950s, FARA was a key part of the Justice Department’s dubious
legal justification for a sweeping U.S. government program intended to
combat fascist, and then communist, propaganda that intercepted and
destroyed thousands of publications sent to the U.S. from foreign
countries.203 The overbroad program ended up catching Russian
novels, Soviet scientific journals, and even copies of the London-based
newspaper The Economist that were critical of U.S. government
policy.204 These interceptions of mail undercut academic and political

200. See GRANT F. SMITH, AMERICA’S DEFENSE LINE: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S
BATTLE TO REGISTER THE ISRAEL LOBBY AS AGENTS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 59–61
(2008) (detailing efforts by some in the Justice Department to have the American Zionist Council
register under FARA).
201. Grant F. Smith, Selective FARA Enforcement: Pakistan’s Alleged Agents Prosecuted,
Israel’s Ignored, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE EAST AFFS. (Sept.–Oct. 2011),
https://www.wrmea.org/011-september-october/selective-fara-enforcement-pakistan-s-allegedagents-prosecuted-israel-s-ignored.html [https://perma.cc/8XSZ-ZTJM].
202. SMITH, supra note 200, at 60.
203. Murray L. Schwartz & James C. N. Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails:
A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 626–27 (1959)
(highlighting that Attorney General Robert H. Jackson’s memo declared that if an unregistered
foreign agent under FARA based outside the country used the U.S. mail service to disseminate
“propaganda,” the mail would become “nonmailable” under the Espionage Act of 1907 as the
mail was designed or intended to violate a penal statute—FARA—in the aid of a foreign
government). Professors Schwartz and Paul point out that under FARA, foreign agents are
defined as being inside the U.S. The memo extended FARA’s reach to those outside the U.S. It
also turned what was explicitly a transparency statute into a justification for destroying
informational material. See id. (“Overlooked was the fact that the purpose of the Registration
Act was disclosure, not censorship.”). Later, a different version of this mail interception program,
which had been given legislative grounding in the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary
Act of 1962, was struck down by the Supreme Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965), as violating the First Amendment. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in TransBorder Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 950–51
(2011).
204. Schwartz & Paul, supra note 203, at 622.
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exchange, arguably contributing to U.S. policymakers being blindsided
by the launch of Sputnik and other Soviet advances.205
A. W.E.B. Du Bois and the Peace Information Center
Perhaps the most infamous prosecution under FARA was that of
W.E.B. Du Bois and other officers of the Peace Information Center in
1951 during the height of McCarthyism. It came after the Justice
Department had created an extensive bureaucracy during World War
II to target Nazi voices using FARA and other national security acts.206
After the War, the Justice Department then turned this bureaucracy
toward the threat of Communist infiltration in the United States.207
Du Bois was one of the original cofounders of the NAACP and a
leading civil rights leader of his generation.208 Throughout his life, he
was connected with international social movements related to race and
peace.209 In April 1949, along with several other U.S. activists, Du Bois
started the Peace Information Center (“PIC”).210 The organization’s
goal was to promote the peaceful resolution of international disputes
and ban the first use of nuclear weapons.211 To achieve this end, the
PIC published literature in the United States from across the world
about international peace activities.212 It also circulated copies of the
Stockholm Appeal, which called for a ban on nuclear weapons and
eventually garnered over two million signatures in the United States.213
The Justice Department saw the circulation of the Stockholm
Appeal as a threat to national security because it encouraged
denuclearization and “pacifism in the face of Soviet aggression.”214 In

205. Id. at 636 (“The American people were soon to be sputniked into recognition that they
had a lot at stake in maintaining . . . the most liberal kind of access to information about the
Communist world.”).
206. GARY, supra note 94, at 197 (discussing development of a bureaucracy to implement
FARA and other internal security acts during World War II).
207. Id. at 243–51 (discussing how the Second Red Scare allowed the Justice Department to
direct internal security acts toward the new threat of Communism).
208. NAACP History: W.E.B. Du Bois, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/naacp-history-w-eb-dubois [https://perma.cc/K3JZ-HGWM].
209. W.E.B. Du Bois, Speech at Philadelphia 3–4 (Apr. 29, 1951) [hereinafter Du Bois,
Speech at Philadelphia], http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312-b201i063/#page/1/mode/1up [https://perma.cc/69XD-CHV7].
210. Id. at 5–6. The group was initially called the Peace Information Bureau.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 6; Lanham, supra note 31.
214. Lanham, supra note 31.
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August 1950, PIC received a letter from the Justice Department
claiming it was engaged in activities that required registration under
FARA.215 PIC responded that it was comprised entirely of Americans
and that it acted for no one but itself.216 Nonetheless, its board shut
down the organization in October 1950 to avoid having to register.217
Even so, in February 1951, five officers of the PIC, including Du Bois,
were indicted for their past failure to register under FARA.218 The
Justice Department did not allege PIC acted as an “agent” of any
foreign government; rather, it argued that PIC worked on behalf of a
group based in Paris called the Committee of the Congress of the
World Defenders of Peace.219 The indictment claimed that PIC
published and disseminated the Stockholm Appeal and other
antinuclear information at the “request” of this French-based group.220
The officers of PIC, including Du Bois, faced five years in jail and
a $10,000 fine.221 The indictment alone inflicted a heavy cost. As Du
Bois wrote in a memoir about the experience: “Although the charge
was not treason, it was widely understood and said that the Peace
Information Center had been discovered to be an agent of Russia.”222
Some newspapers, including many in the African American
community, criticized the government’s charges against Du Bois.223 For
example, Langston Hughes wrote a stirring essay in defense of Du Bois
in the Chicago Defender in which he compared Du Bois to great
intellectual martyrs such as Voltaire and Socrates.224 Albert Einstein, a
proponent of international peace, volunteered to be a character
witness at his trial.225 However, other newspapers wrote stories that

215. W.E.B. DU BOIS, IN BATTLE FOR PEACE: THE STORY OF MY 83RD BIRTHDAY 34
(Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 2007).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 37. PIC did continue some activities after October 1950. Id.
218. Id. at 36–37.
219. Id. at 36–37, 89–90.
220. Id. at 36–37.
221. Lanham, supra note 31.
222. DU BOIS, supra note 215, at 48.
223. See id. at 50–51 (noting some newspapers that defended Du Bois and called for
withdrawal of the indictment).
224. Langston Hughes, The Accusers’ Names Nobody Will Remember, but History Records
DuBois, CHI. DEFENDER (Oct. 6, 1951), http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312b286-i046/#page/1/mode/1up [https://perma.cc/7UST-MTUP].
225. Lanham, supra note 31.
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implied that Du Bois was a Soviet sympathizer.226 Du Bois himself was
frustrated that many African American elites did not defend him more
vigorously.227
During the trial of Du Bois and his codefendants in November
1951, the defense had planned to introduce an affidavit that showed
the Congress of the World Defenders of Peace never made any
“request” of PIC to distribute information. Rather, the Committee
simply sent PIC peace material, as they did to any of their members,
which PIC independently decided to distribute.228 Ultimately, however,
the government did not argue that PIC had ever acted even at the
“request” of the Committee.229
Instead, the government claimed that to be a “publicity agent”
under FARA, the foreign principal did not even have to be aware of
the agent. It only had to show that “it was the subjective intent of [PIC]
to disseminate information in the United States, propaganda for and
on behalf of, and [to] further the propaganda objectives of the
European organization.”230 Du Bois would later write that the
government essentially argued that an agency relationship could be
created under FARA when a domestic organization simply held a
parallel view as that of a foreign organization.231 Although the
government’s theory of “parallelism” of speech may seem outlandish,
it was similar to the argument the Justice Department had made when
successfully prosecuting Nazi media outlets in the United States during
World War II.232 Ultimately, the district court judge rejected the
government’s theory of agency, found that the government had not

226. See DU BOIS, supra note 215, at 49–50 (noting that the New York Herald Tribune wrote
that “[t]he Du Bois outfit was set up to promote a tricky appeal of Soviet origin”).
227. See id. at 52 (stating that many “educated and well-to-do Negro friends” did not speak
out in Du Bois’s defense).
228. Id. at 94–96 (recounting a deposition in which Jean Laffitte, the Secretary of the World
Defenders of Peace, said “that the Committee had not appointed the Peace Information Center
as its agent for the circulation of the Stockholm Appeal” and “denied that he had ever requested
the Peace Information Center to disseminate the Stockholm Appeal”).
229. See id. at 99.
230. Id.
231. See id. (“[The prosecutor] replied that the Government insisted that the agency was
implied by the similarity of ideas.”).
232. During World War II, Harold Lasswell had created “parallel tests to demonstrate the
connections between [defendants in FARA prosecutions] and the official German propaganda
line.” GARY, supra note 94, at 215.
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presented sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the officers of PIC,
and dismissed the case.233
Though Du Bois and his codefendants may have won in court, the
costs were substantial. They had spent substantial time and resources
for their legal defense, forcing Du Bois to fundraise across the
country.234 Du Bois’s reputation never recovered and he continued to
face persecution from the U.S. government.235 And, of course, the
prosecution of Du Bois and his codefendants by the Justice
Department successfully led to the closure of PIC,236 signaling that the
U.S. government would target organizations that took too strong a
stance or were too successful in mobilizing against nuclear militarism.
B. House Committee Investigation of Environmental Nonprofits
While the Justice Department is the only entity with the power to
prosecute someone for failing to comply with FARA, Congress may
also investigate alleged violations. This increases the likelihood that
the Act will be used in a politicized fashion.
In 2018, the House Committee on Natural Resources began
investigating the potential manipulation of tax-exempt 501(c)
organizations by foreign entities to influence U.S. environmental and
natural-resource policy. As part of that investigation, the Chairman of
the Committee, Representative Rob Bishop, and Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Representative Bruce
Westerman, sent letters to four prominent U.S. environmental
organizations—NRDC, Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”), the
World Research Institute (“WRI”), and Earthjustice—asserting that

233. DU BOIS, supra note 215, at 101. The judge seemed to accept the more stringent test for
agency, based on the Restatement of Agency, followed in United States v. German-American
Vocational League, 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1946), even though that case was interpreting the 1938
Act, not the expanded 1942 Act. See id. (“[A]pplying the test . . . in [German-American
Vocational League] which, presumably, is the law of the land . . . the Government has failed to
support . . . the allegations . . . .”); see also HERBERT BROWNELL JR., ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED FOR
THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1950 TO DECEMBER 31, 1954, at 18–19 (1955) (“The defense motion
upon which the judge ruled was based upon [German-American Vocational League] decided
under [FARA] prior to the 1942 amendments . . . .”).
234. DU BOIS, supra note 215, at 104.
235. See Lanham, supra note 31 (noting that “the trial and the publicity around it ruined [Du
Bois’] career” and that the U.S. government revoked his passport in 1952).
236. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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they had failed to register as “foreign agents” under FARA.237 The
letters demanded that the organizations explain why they had not
registered and called on them to provide a litany of information. The
ranking Democratic minority member of the Committee condemned
the investigation as a “witch hunt.”238
The letters implied that organizations that were critical of the U.S.
government were suspicious. For example, perhaps the primary piece
of evidence against NRDC supporting its need to register was that it
had been more critical of the U.S.’s environmental policy than China’s.
As the Committee Chairman, Representative Rob Bishop, wrote:
“When engaging on environmental issues concerning China, the
NRDC appears to practice self-censorship, issue selection bias, and
generally refrains from criticizing Chinese officials.”239 He continued:
By contrast, the NRDC takes an adversarial approach to its advocacy
practices in the United States. . . . The Committee is concerned that
the NRDC’s need to maintain access to Chinese officials has
influenced its political activities in the United States and may require
compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).240

237. See Letter from Rob Bishop, Chairman, House of Representatives Comm. on Nat. Res.
& Bruce Westerman, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Nat. Res., to Abigail Dillen, President, Earthjustice (Oct. 1, 2018)
[hereinafter Earthjustice Letter], https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2018-10-01_bishop_westerman_to_dillen_earthjustice_re_fara.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GTUKFNE]; Letter from Rob Bishop, Chairman, House of Representatives Comm. on Nat. Res. &
Bruce Westerman, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Nat. Res., to Andrew Steer, President & CEO, World Res. Inst.
(Sept.
5,
2018)
[hereinafter
WRI
Letter],
https://republicansnaturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bishop-westerman_to_steer_wri_re_fara_09.05.2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EFB-8QGC]; Letter from Rob Bishop, Chairman, House of Representatives
Comm. on Nat. Res. & Bruce Westerman, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Nat. Res., to Kierán Suckling, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Inc. (June 20, 2018) [hereinafter CBD Letter], https://republicansnaturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_to_center_bio_diversity_06.20.18.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X4AW-DJCL]; Letter from Rob Bishop, Chairman, House of Representatives Comm.
on Nat. Res. & Bruce Westerman, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the Comm. on Nat. Res., to Rhea Suh, President, Nat. Res. Def. Council
(June 5, 2018) [hereinafter NRDC Letter], https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/bishop-westerman_to_nrdc_06.05.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HSF-YEGL].
238. Mark Hand, Incoming House Committee Leader To Call Off ‘Witch Hunt’ Against
(Dec.
3,
2018,
12:17
PM),
Environmental
Groups,
THINKPROGRESS
https://thinkprogress.org/house-democratic-leader-pledges-end-to-witch-hunt-againstenvironmental-groups-e011e256bd90 [https://perma.cc/3RKC-KUJ6].
239. NRDC Letter, supra note 237, at 3.
240. Id. at 4.
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The letter provided several examples where the Committee
claimed the NRDC was too lenient on Chinese environmental policy,
but it provided no evidence of the Chinese government directing or
requesting NRDC to take any action, or of NRDC complying with such
requests. Instead, seemingly in an attempt to create an agency
relationship, Chairman Bishop in the letter simply noted that “NRDC
leadership regularly meets with senior Chinese and Communist Party
officials.”241
The letter to CBD focused on its advocacy, including litigation, in
opposing the planned relocation of the Marine Base on Okinawa in
Japan on environmental grounds.242 The Chairman wrote that CBD
engaged in political activities covered under the Act by arranging
meetings with U.S. politicians and holding press conferences in support
of Japanese activists and the Okinawa government.243
The letters to all four organizations interpreted FARA broadly.
For example, they noted that the organizations must register if they
engage in covered activities “at the . . . request . . . of a foreign principal
or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly,
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in
major part by a foreign principal.”244 In other words, Chairman Bishop
invoked, and emphasized, the broadest language in the agency
definition of FARA when describing why these groups may need to
register.
Notably, both CBD and NRDC had openly criticized Bishop in
their advocacy prior to being investigated for FARA violations. In
2017, CBD gave Bishop its annual Rubber Dodo Award, which
“honors” the person that most aggressively sought to destroy the
natural heritage of the United States or drive a species extinct.245
NRDC also publicly criticized his environmental record.246
241. Id. at 2–3.
242. CBD Letter, supra note 237, at 1.
243. Id. at 1–2.
244. WRI Letter, supra note 237, at 5–6 (alteration in original) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)
(2018)); Earthjustice Letter, supra note 237, at 3 (same); NRDC Letter, supra note 237, at 4
(same); CBD Letter, supra note 237, at 5 (same).
245. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Utah Congressman Rob Bishop Wins
Rubber Dodo Award: Extremist Agenda To Give Away Public Lands, Kill Off Endangered
Species
Cited
(Jan.
5,
2017),
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/
press_releases/2017/rubber-dodo-01-05-2017.php [https://perma.cc/2ZJ9-Z2RC].
246. See The Real Lowdown: The Trump and Congressional Republican Assault on Our
Environment, Vol. 28, NAT. RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/nrdc/real-lowdown-trump-and-congressional-republican-assault-
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The investigation of these four environmental organizations
ended when Democrats took control of the House of Representatives
in 2019.247 However, these organizations had to expend resources
defending themselves from charges of being “foreign agents.” The
investigation of these environmental organizations also sent a chilling
message about how members of Congress can use FARA in a political
manner to target entities with whom they disagree.
C. RT TV America and Foreign Media
At the request of the Justice Department, in November 2017, RT
TV America, a Russian-government-funded media organization,
registered under FARA.248 The targeting of Russian media
organizations, while simultaneously ignoring other entities seemingly
covered under the Act, has raised the specter of politicized
enforcement. It also demonstrated how registering can have serious
secondary effects beyond the stigma or administrative burden of
registering.
RT TV America was founded in 2010, as the U.S. arm of RT,
formerly known as Russia Today.249 RT is owned by TV-Novosti, a
nonprofit news organization based in Russia.250 The Russian
government is the primary funder of RT.251 RT TV America hires many
U.S. journalists and has been nominated for several Emmys.252
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”)
released a report in January 2017 finding that RT TV America was a
central part of the Russian effort to influence the 2016 election.253
our-environment-vol-28 [https://perma.cc/ER6F-FRMW] (calling Representative Rob Bishop’s
proposal to require local signoff on any national monument bigger than 640 acres “radical”).
247. See Hand, supra note 238 (noting plans to end the investigation).
248. Wilson, supra note 14; see Letter from Heather H. Hunt, Chief, FARA Registration
Unit, Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to RTTV America, Inc. (Aug. 17, 2017) [hereinafter
RT TV America Letter], https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000160-79a9-d762-a374-7dfbebe30001
[https://perma.cc/NS64-CEB4] (“RTTV America has an obligation to register under FARA.”).
249. Id. at 2–3.
250. RT TV America Letter, supra note 248, at 3.
251. See id. at 2–3.
252. See RT America Nominated for National Emmy News Award in US – Chief Editor,
SPUTNIK (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:22 PM), https://sputniknews.com/art_living/201703231051889022-rtemmy-award [https://perma.cc/8T3B-LUR4] (announcing that RT TV America had been
nominated for one American Emmy Award and noting it had previously been nominated for four
International Emmy Awards).
253. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
AND
INTENTIONS
IN
RECENT
US
ELECTIONS
6–8
(2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T3B-LUR4] (claiming
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However, there is disagreement about how much of an audience RT
TV America actually had during the election, whether its programming
was designed to influence voters, whether the network was biased
toward either candidate, and whether it had any actual influence on the
election.254
In its letter to RT TV America asking it to register under FARA,
the Justice Department claimed that the network operated as an agent
of both TV-Novosti and RT, who were themselves “alter egos of the
Kremlin.”255 It claimed RT TV America needed to register because it
engaged in political activities in the interests of a foreign principal and
acted as both a publicity agent and an information-service employee of
a foreign principal. Citing to the DNI report, the Justice Department
letter stated that “the Intelligence Community has concluded that RT
is ‘a messaging tool . . . [used] to undermine faith in the US
Government and fuel political protest.’”256 The letter went on to find
that “RT’s broadcasts consistently mirror the opinions of the
Kremlin.”257 It provided a handful of examples to show how RT TV
America’s programming paralleled the opinions of the Russian
government, including its reporting on Iran’s ballistic-missile testing,
criticism of NATO, and criticism of claims that the Russian
government had interfered in the presidential election.258 Based on
these examples and quoting from FARA, the Justice Department
wrote that RT TV America sought to:
“[I]nfluence . . . any section of the public within the United States with
reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or
foreign policies of the United States, or with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations” of Russia, for or in the

that RT sought to cast doubt on the integrity of the election process and conducted strategic
messaging for the Russian government).
254. See Steven Erlanger, Russia’s RT Network: Is It More BBC or K.G.B.?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/russias-rt-network-is-it-more-bbcor-kgb.html [https://perma.cc/9Q29-3NDB] (interviewing commentators with differing views on
RT TV America’s reach and influence); Danielle Ryan, RT America Was Not ‘Pro-Trump,’
NATION (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/rt-america-was-not-pro-trump
[https://perma.cc/ZFC7-YS9R] (noting that many contributors to RT took positions against
presidential candidate Donald Trump).
255. RT TV America Letter, supra note 248, at 6.
256. Id. at 5 (alteration in original).
257. Id. at 6.
258. Id. at 6–7.
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interests of Russia, and is therefore engaged in “political activities”
[under FARA].259

The Justice Department explained it did not matter whether RT
TV America exercised editorial independence, as the outlet claimed; it
would be a foreign agent under FARA if it acted at the order or request
of TV-Novosti.260
The Justice Department also separately found that RT TV
America acted as a “publicity agent” under FARA for TV-Novosti and
RT because it had secured channels in the United States that TVNovosti used to distribute RT programming.261 Further, it claimed that
RT TV America was an “information-service employee” because, on
behalf of TV-Novosti, it was involved in “‘furnishing, disseminating, or
publishing’” programming that “concerned ‘conditions’ of a foreign
government or ‘foreign country,’ including but not limited to
Russia.”262
When RT TV America registered as a “foreign agent,” it protested
that it was “inform[ing], not influenc[ing]” the U.S. public.263 Others
also criticized the Justice Department’s use of FARA as harming
journalistic integrity. For instance, the Committee to Protect
Journalists pointed out: “In invoking FARA, Congress is relying on a
notoriously opaque unit within the Department of Justice to draw an
impossible line between propaganda and journalism. Source
protection, media access, and the US promotion of press freedom
abroad may all be compromised.”264
Shortly after RT TV America registered under FARA, the
Executive Committee of the Congressional Radio & Television
Correspondents’ Galleries revoked RT TV America’s Capitol Hill
press credentials because it was a “foreign agent.”265 The incident not
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 7 (omissions in original).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXHIBIT A TO T&R PRODUCTIONS LLC’S REGISTRATION
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED
4
(Nov.
10,
2017),
https://www.fara.gov/docs/6485-Exhibit-AB-20171110-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSY8-4GP3] (claiming that RT TV America’s programming is intended
“merely to inform, not influence,” and not to “primarily benefit any foreign government or
political party”).
264. Ellerbeck & Asher-Schapiro, supra note 33.
265. Hadas Gold, Congressional Press Office Yanks RT’s Credentials, CNN BUS. (Nov. 30,
2017,
10:49
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/29/media/rt-capitol-credentialsrevoked/index.html [https://perma.cc/YN2Z-QWGD].
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only limited the ability of RT TV America to report on affairs in the
U.S. Congress but also raised the prospect of other secondary effects
of registering. For example, some have noted that journalists may now
decide not to work for RT TV America, may avoid sharing RT TV
America’s articles or videos on social media, and might even think
twice before voicing opinions similar to RT TV America’s content.266
Some public officials may also stop conducting interviews with those
registered under FARA.267 One could similarly imagine Twitter,
Facebook, or other social media publishers creating separate rules for
how content is labeled or shared from news organizations registered as
“foreign agents.”268
Those who provide commercial services to media organizations
registered under FARA have also faced consequences. In October
2018, RM Broadcasting LLC filed a lawsuit against the Justice
Department after the Justice Department claimed that RM
Broadcasting had to register under FARA for leasing broadcast
airtime to Sputnik.269 RM Broadcasting responded that it did not act as
an “agent” of any “foreign principal” and that registering would be
burdensome and allow competitors to view confidential business
information.270 A judge dismissed RM Broadcasting’s suit, finding that
it rebroadcasted Sputnik and so was a “publicity agent” under
FARA.271
It is not clear if the Justice Department has asked other providers
of spectrum to RT TV America or Sputnik to register. However, in
February 2018, RT TV America was dropped by a TV station based
out of Washington, D.C., which RT TV America claimed was related

266. Aaron Maté, RT Was Forced To Register As a Foreign Agent, NATION (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/rt-was-forced-to-register-as-a-foreign-agent [https://perma.cc/
R4QA-LA94]. As an example, a staffer in a Georgia gubernatorial campaign was reportedly
forced to resign for giving an interview to Sputnik. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. (explaining that Twitter recently barred RT TV America and Sputnik from
advertising).
269. Michel, supra note 34.
270. Id.
271. See Eriq Gardner, Justice Department Wins Lawsuit Demanding Radio Station Register
REP.
(May
7,
2019,
11:38
AM),
As
Russian
Agent,
HOLLYWOOD
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/justice-department-wins-lawsuit-demanding-radiostation-register-as-russian-agent-1208400 [https://perma.cc/2UEL-VYN3].
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to its registration under FARA.272 As such, requiring RT TV America
and Sputnik to register under FARA resulted in far more than
“transparency”; it undermined each organization’s ability to have their
broadcasts transmitted and heard.
At the same time, there is a question why Russian media
organizations were targeted under the Act. Under the broad logic of
the Justice Department letter to RT TV America, a range of other
media outlets should probably need to register as well. For example,
BBC America is the U.S. arm of a foreign-government-run news
network and ostensibly engages in “political activities” in the interest
of a foreign principal. At the very least, it is difficult to imagine that
perspectives aired on the BBC America do not at times “mirror” the
views of the British government. BBC America also ostensibly acts as
a “publicity agent” and “information-service employee.”
Fears of FARA’s politicized use were amplified in September
2018 when the Justice Department asked Xinhua News Agency and
China Global Television Network to register. This request came
amidst—and may have been partially motivated by—rising trade and
political tensions with China.273 It is not just Chinese news agencies that
are targeted. Members of Congress have also called for other media
organizations to register when they have connections to certain
countries or controversial views. For example, Senator Marco Rubio,
a frequent critic of China, “tweeted that a partnership between Politico
and the South China Morning Post should possibly be registered under
FARA.”274 In March 2018, members of Congress sent a letter to the
Justice Department requesting they investigate whether Al Jazeera
should register.275 In justifying their request, the congresspersons noted
that Al Jazeera has a “record of radical anti-American, anti-Semitic,
and anti-Israel broadcasts,”276 supporting the belief that FARA can be
used to suppress dissident or unpopular voices.

272. Ben Finley & Jim Heintz, Russia-Backed TV Channel Is Gone from DC-Area Broadcasts,
AP NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/d45ceac99c7747e9813b89932e84e05e
[https://perma.cc/WF9W-3PZE].
273. See John Bowden, DOJ Orders Two Chinese State-Run Media Organizations To Register
as Foreign Agents, HILL (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:28 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/nationalsecurity/407274-doj-orders-two-chinese-state-run-media-organizations-to-register-as [https://
perma.cc/4G8A-85UD] (noting that release of news of the move by the Justice Department came
a day after the U.S. announced major new trade measures against China).
274. Ellerbeck & Asher-Schapiro, supra note 33.
275. See generally Congressional Letter concerning Al Jazeera, supra note 16.
276. Id. at 1.
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These three examples show that the politicized use of FARA can
come from both the Justice Department—the agency tasked with
enforcing the Act—and individual members of Congress. In addition,
the effects of such enforcement actions can be diverse: the targeted
entity could be forced to shut down—as with PIC—or it could lose
important industry access—like RT TV America. Notably, none of
these examples featured the Act being applied to lobbying activities;
rather, each instance involved entities allegedly attempting to
influence the U.S. public more generally, whether by nonprofits or the
media.
These examples of politicized use of FARA are relatively rare, in
large part because the Act is not frequently enforced, particularly
outside the lobbying context. Going forward, however, this could
change. U.S. laws related to national security, such as FARA, are
generally broad but historically underenforced.277 Scholars like
Professor David Pozen have argued that the enforcement of such laws
are driven by the incentives or political imperatives of the actors who
enforce them.278 As such, enforcement tendencies can shift as political
calculations change.
After the 2016 presidential election, there has been new attention
focused on how an increasingly interconnected U.S. democracy may be
susceptible to foreign influence, particularly when authoritarianism
and illiberal democracy are enjoying political ascendance globally.279
Such a political environment arguably creates new political will to
increase enforcement of FARA to target not only foreign lobbyists but
277. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 515 (2013) [hereinafter
Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan] (finding that the courts have indicated that the U.S. government
has extensive authority to prosecute employees who leak information but that it has a
longstanding practice of failing to enforce these laws); Daniel B. Rice, Nonenforcement by
Accretion: The Logan Act and the Take Care Clause, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 445–46 (2018)
(claiming that although there have been many opportunities to enforce the Logan Act, it has
seemingly ceased to function as a criminal act); Kelner et al., supra note 93 (explaining how
prosecutors “revived from hibernation” the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “a decade ago”).
278. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan, supra note 277, at 519 (arguing that enforcement of
antileaking laws varies based on “personal incentives, bureaucratic politics, and functional system
imperatives”).
279. See, e.g., Henry Farrell, American Democracy Is an Easy Target, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
17,
2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/17/american-democracy-was-asking-for-it
[https://perma.cc/47E2-REXH] (discussing how Americans have become paranoid about foreign
influence in their politics, particularly through the internet).
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also foreign disinformation and electioneering activities. As was
discussed in Part II, during World War II, FARA was then arguably
used in a politicized manner to target prominent fascist and communist
voices in the United States. Few were critical of this selective approach
at the time because the country was at war.
Today, in a domestically polarized environment280 where the
enemies of the U.S. are less clear281 and foreign disinformation
campaigns often rely on amplifying existing U.S. voices, such as Black
Lives Matter or the pro-gun lobby,282 there are significant reasons to
believe that the politicized use of FARA is particularly dangerous.
IV. FARA’S POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS
This Part outlines how FARA’s breadth arguably violates the First
Amendment’s free-speech principles and how it may be
unconstitutionally vague. Though this Article focuses on how FARA
can be used in a politicized manner to target controversial or dissenting
speech, it is important to recognize that FARA can also more broadly
chill speech. Even when the Act’s use is not politicized, FARA’s
current language can create confusion for nonprofits, media

280. See, e.g., The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RES. CTR.
(Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-valuesgrows-even-wider [https://perma.cc/FJ9A-HS2C] (documenting increasing partisan divisions in
the United States on political values between 1994 and 2017).
281. In U.S. politics, there are claims that numerous and varied forces are undermining U.S.
interests, including major trading partners like China as well as significant allies like Saudi Arabia
or Israel. See Rashid Khalidi, Opinion, Unwavering Support of Israel Harms U.S. Interests,
(Aug.
6,
2014,
2:45
PM),
Encourages
Extremism,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/05/can-the-us-still-be-a-leader-in-the-middleeast/unwavering-support-of-israel-harms-us-interests-encourages-extremism [https://perma.cc/
CZ65-B3W2] (arguing that overly strong support of Israel harms U.S. interests); Aaron David
Miller & Richard Sokolsky, Opinion, The U.S.-Saudi Relationship Is Worth Preserving – But Not
POST
(Oct.
25,
2018,
3:27
PM),
Under
the
Current
Terms,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/25/the-u-s-saudi-relationship
-is-worth-preserving-but-not-under-the-current-terms [https://perma.cc/53EU-YHLM] (claiming
arguing that Saudi Arabia undermines U.S. interests); Josh Rogin, Opinion, China’s Interference
in U.S. Politics Is Just Beginning, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018 6:35 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/chinas-interference-in-us-politics-isjust-beginning/2018/09/20/2b462558-bd0f-11e8-8792-78719177250f_story.html [https://perma.cc/
X3FJ-CZML] (describing tactics the Chinese government uses to influence U.S. politics).
282. See, e.g., Tom Huddleston Jr., Russian Facebook Ads Targeted Muslims, Gun Owners,
Black Lives Matter, FORTUNE (Oct. 2, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/02/facebook-russian-adscongress [https://perma.cc/9CTE-WN88] (noting that Russian-linked ads that targeted the 2016
U.S. presidential election were aimed at gun owners, Black Lives Matter groups, and those
favoring stricter immigration control, among others).
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organizations, and others about whether they need to register. As a
result, nonprofits based outside the United States may not engage in
advocacy in the United States. Similarly, U.S. nonprofits or media
organizations may limit their international interactions and
partnerships out of fear that doing otherwise may require registration.
When nonprofits and media organizations limit global connections,
this can have the effect of nationalizing civil society by rendering
relationships across borders suspect, creating a world where each
country has its own nonprofits and media, but it becomes difficult for
a transnational civil society to develop in order to address global
problems collectively. In this way, the broad provisions of FARA can
curtail speech and undermine civil society’s ability to address pressing
national and global challenges.
In Meese v. Keene283 in 1987, the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional FARA’s requirement at the time that materials covered
by the Act be classified as “political propaganda.”284 In the case, a
member of the California State Senate had wanted to show three
Canadian films on nuclear war and acid rain that were classified as
“political propaganda” under FARA.285 The state senator claimed that
by classifying informational materials using this term, the government
undermined his speech and violated his First Amendment rights.286 In
a 5–3 decision, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court
upholding the requirement.287 He found that classifying these materials
as “political propaganda” did not place them “beyond the pale of
legitimate discourse”288 and that the public understood it is a “neutral,”
rather than “pejorative,” term.289
In dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that the appellant claimed that
the term “propaganda” created the perception that anything classified
as such was “unreliable and not to be trusted.”290 Justice Blackmun
claimed: “By ignoring the practical effect of the Act’s classification
scheme, the Court unfortunately permits Congress to accomplish by

283. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)
284. See id. at 479–85.
285. Id. at 467–68.
286. Id. at 473–74.
287. Id. at 467–85.
288. Id. at 480 (quoting Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1985)).
289. See id. at 483 (“We should presume that the people who have a sufficient understanding
of the law to know that the term ‘political propaganda’ is used to describe the regulated category
also know that the definition is a broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one.”).
290. Id. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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indirect means what it could not impose directly—a restriction of
appellee’s political speech.”291 He opined that there was no compelling
interest to classify such material as “political propaganda” and that the
classification should be struck down.292 In 1995, Congress amended the
Act to remove the term “political propaganda.”293
Importantly, the majority explicitly said that the constitutionality
of the underlying registration, filing, and disclosure requirements were
not at issue nor were “the validity of the characteristics used to define
the regulated category of expressive materials.”294 Since Meese,
commentators have noted that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence has become more robust, and some have suggested the
Court today would be skeptical of the constitutionality of key
provisions of FARA.295 Specifically, FARA’s speech compulsion and
its burdens on a category of speakers make it particularly vulnerable to
First Amendment challenges.
First, FARA requires its registrants to engage in “compelled
speech”—that is, they are forced to make affirmative statements
regarding their status under the Act. FARA registrants must place a
conspicuous statement on any informational material “for or in the
interests” of a foreign principal that the materials are distributed by the
agent on behalf of the foreign principal and that more information is
available at the Justice Department.296 For many Americans who may
be covered under FARA, this labeling requirement is stigmatizing,
controversial, and undercuts their speech because it implies that the
“agent” is not acting independently but instead on behalf of a foreign
principal. Frequently, this may be a misleading characterization.
Indeed, simply being required to register as an “agent” under FARA

291. Id. at 491.
292. Id. at 495–96.
293. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 9, 109 Stat. 691, 699–700 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (2018)).
294. Meese, 481 U.S. at 467.
295. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 35, at 686. But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transborder
Political Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 473, 475 (2018) (arguing that although the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts have dramatically expanded protected domestic speech activity, transborder
speech activity has not been protected as strongly); Zick, supra note 203, at 944–45 (claiming that
the Court has generally had a “provincial” understanding of the First Amendment that has limited
its applicability to cross-border speech and arguing for a more cosmopolitan cross-border
interpretation).
296. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (2018).
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could itself be considered a form of compelled speech given how
controversial the label is.297
Compelled speech has been particularly disfavored by the federal
courts in recent years.298 For instance, in National Institute of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra,299 the Supreme Court struck down a
California mandate that certain pregnancy centers disclose that one
could obtain a set of services, including abortion, from state-sponsored
clinics. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the
disclosure requirement violated the First Amendment because it
“targets speakers, not speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome
disclosure requirement that will chill their protected speech.”300 Of
course, many disclosure requirements are clearly constitutional, and
Citizens United v. FEC301 explicitly upheld a disclosure requirement
for corporate political speech.302 However, when a disclosure
requirement functions like FARA to chill or undercut speech, it is
likely to face scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Second, FARA does not regulate types of speech; it regulates
categories of speakers, applying different regulations to the speech of
“agents of foreign principals.” In Citizens United, the Court found “no
basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored
speakers.”303 As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, however, such
297. The Supreme Court has struck down registration requirements for political speech in
other contexts. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539–41 (1945) (striking down a registration
requirement for labor organizers to make a public speech because the government could not
identify an adequate justification for the requirement).
298. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down
as unconstitutional and stigmatizing a requirement that companies disclose on their websites and
in SEC filings whether they used conflict minerals), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First
Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 339 (2016) (describing how claims of
“compelled speech” have become a key tool for advocates of a deregulatory First Amendment).
299. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
300. Id. at 2378.
301. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
302. Id. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer
and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”).
303. Id. at 341. “Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others.” Id. at 340; see also Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (“This
Court’s precedents are deeply skeptical of laws that ‘distinguis[h] among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others.’ Speaker-based laws run the risk that ‘the State has left
unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views.’” (citations omitted)
(first quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341, then quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 580 (2011))).
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reasoning would seem to imply that foreign speakers should enjoy the
same political-speech rights as domestic speakers.304 The majority did
not refute Justice Stevens’s contention and instead held off from
deciding “whether the Government has a compelling interest in
preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our
Nation’s political process.”305 At the very least, the majority’s reasoning
in Citizen United would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court would
closely scrutinize the broad categorization of certain speakers, many of
whom are U.S. citizens, as “foreign agents” under FARA.
Since FARA frequently burdens or stigmatizes political speech,
there is a high likelihood its relevant provisions would be subject to
strict scrutiny, which requires the government prove any restriction
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.”306 FARA may well further a “compelling interest” of the
government, specifically protecting democratic decision-making from
undue foreign influence—although, as Part V explains, the goals of the
Act can sometimes be unclear.307 However, it is hard to call the Act
“narrowly tailored.” As specified in Part II, FARA’s provisions cover
a wide range of actors, including media organizations, nonprofits, and
public officials, and it often imposes significant burdens on those
entities’ speech. This is true even where these entities’ activities are not
aimed at influencing democratic decision-making or where the
relationship between the foreign principal and domestic entity may be
minor and not actually influencing the domestic entity’s political
speech. If FARA was not subject to strict scrutiny, it would likely face
some variant of intermediate scrutiny.308

304. Dissenting in Citizens United, Justice Stevens stated:
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity of a speaker has no
relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead to some
remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda
broadcasts to our troops by ‘Tokyo Rose’ during World War II the same protection as
speech by Allied commanders.
558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 295, at 512 (arguing that
under the logic of Citizens United, “speech that originates outside the nation’s borders should be
no less protected than speech that originates within those boarders [sic]”).
305. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.
306. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
307. See infra Part V.
308. Intermediate scrutiny has been used to strike down disclosure requirements in other
contexts. See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359,
372 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (en banc).
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Significantly, even if the Justice Department only enforces FARA
in cases where its use would likely not violate the First Amendment—
such as in the case of paid lobbyists for foreign governments—the Act,
or provisions of it, could still be struck down as unconstitutionally
overbroad. As Justice Thomas wrote in Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party,309 “[i]n the First Amendment
context . . . a law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad
because a ‘substantial number’ of its applications are unconstitutional,
‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”310 As the
Ninth Circuit recently concluded, this outcome “is based on the idea
that speakers may be chilled from expressing themselves if overbroad
criminal laws are on the books.”311 As such, a paid lobbyist for a foreign
government could make a First Amendment claim, arguing that the
Act impermissibly chills the speech of activists, the media, or others
who are, for example, acting at the request of a foreign individual,
nonprofit, or company.
Finally, a point related to but separate from the First Amendment
argument is that several of FARA’s key provisions are unclear, leading
some commentators to suggest that they may be unconstitutionally
vague.312 The Supreme Court has held that a law is unconstitutionally
vague when it does not “give [a] person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly.”313 Given FARA’s ambiguous, convoluted, and vague
provisions, it is frequently difficult for persons or entities to know
whether they must register.
V. TARGETING FARA
To address the dangers of politicization and the Act’s
constitutional vulnerabilities, FARA needs to be better tailored to

309. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
310. Id. at 449 n.6 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)); see also United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citing Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. 442).
311. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 470 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To combat that
chilling effect, even a person whose activity is clearly not protected may challenge a law as
overbroad under the First Amendment.”).
312. See, e.g., Ryan Lovelace, Washington’s FARA Frenzy Spurs New Legal Business, NAT’L
L.J. (Sept. 27, 2018, 3:10 PM), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=6ef66097-50b6-4d78-a8b23a4b25fe9fc1&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-NTLAWJ-gml45ffldm&pdbypasscitatordocs
=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/3L5W-M6XU] (quoting Covington
& Burling partner Robert Kelner, who noted that FARA might be unconstitutionally vague).
313. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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serve the needs for which it was originally enacted. This last Part argues
that to do so successfully requires clarifying the purpose of the Act.
Based on insights gained from a discussion of what appropriate goals
are for transparency statutes like FARA, it ends by proposing three
reform strategies.
A. Clarifying FARA’s Purpose
Too often, FARA is seen as a tool to combat, or make transparent,
very different kinds of foreign influence. However, it is important to
note that not all these different types of foreign influence raise the
same concerns, nor is the bluntness of FARA appropriate to address
them. This Section examines three of the most prominent justifications
for FARA: creating transparency around (1) foreign lobbying; (2)
foreign electioneering activity; and (3) foreign disinformation. It claims
that FARA, and transparency tools like it, are most appropriate, and
on strongest ground, when applied to those who clearly are acting at
the direction or control of a foreign government or political party and
when the covered activity involves core democratic processes aimed at
directly influencing government, such as lobbying or electioneering.
Drawing on this framework, this Section posits that certain types
of lobbying activity by agents of foreign principals may beneficially fall
under the disclosure requirements of the Act. Meanwhile, although
electioneering could be regulated by FARA, this activity is so core to
the democratic process that U.S. law already bars foreigners from
engaging in much electioneering activity. As such, where there is
inappropriate foreign influence in U.S. elections, it is generally better
to bar this activity through other legislation rather than attempt to
make it transparent through FARA. Finally, this Section argues that
FARA is generally a poor tool to counter foreign disinformation.
FARA’s breadth both captures a wide range of legitimate and
beneficial media and nonprofit advocacy activity, generating a high
likelihood of politicized abuse, and it is frequently ineffective at
countering genuine disinformation.
1. Foreign Lobbying. FARA is sometimes viewed as one of the
earliest U.S. lobbying laws, enacted before the Regulation of Lobbying
Act of 1946—which has since been repealed—the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of
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2007.314 While FARA initially focused squarely on the challenge of
foreign propaganda, by the 1960s, perhaps the most prominent
justification of FARA was to provide transparency around foreign
lobbying, particularly that of foreign governments and political
parties.315
There are good reasons for applying scrutiny to lobbyists of
foreign governments and political parties. Lobbying is core to the U.S.
democratic process as it involves concrete attempts to change
legislation or policy, often with outsize effect, and is frequently
undertaken outside the public eye.316 The burden of registering under
FARA is seemingly not as high for a lobbyist of a foreign government
or political party as lobbyists are frequently sophisticated actors who
already often have to register under the LDA. The stigma is also likely
to be less significant as public officials are more likely to understand
FARA’s labeling requirements. On top of that, for many lobbyists, the
label is seemingly accurate as they are engaged in attempting to
influence U.S. government officials at the direction and control of
foreign governments or political parties.
Importantly, foreign governments already have diplomatic staff
who can engage with policymakers in the United States without having
to register under the LDA or FARA, making it less clear why foreign
governments, in particular, need lobbyists at all. Foreign political
parties, which lack an official diplomatic staff, arguably have a greater
need for lobbyists, but since they may later come to power it seems
appropriate to treat them similarly to lobbyists of foreign governments.
Although creating additional transparency requirements for
lobbyists of foreign governments and political parties seems justifiable,
this is not to say that even when FARA is used to create transparency
in lobbying that it is appropriately tailored to address this goal. In
particular, FARA’s broad agency definition can require those who are
not actually lobbyists for a foreign government or political party to
register for acting as a lobbyist, unfairly stigmatizing them. Consider,
for instance, the example of the Center for Biological Diversity’s work
314. See JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44292, THE LOBBYING DISCLOSURE
ACT AT 20: ANALYSIS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6–12 (2015) (recounting the history of U.S.
lobbying laws).
315. DOJ ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 4.
316. See, e.g., Ben Freeman, How Much It Costs To Buy US Foreign Policy, NATION (Oct. 4,
2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-much-it-costs-to-buy-us-foreign-policy
[https://perma.cc/XU8Q-LYK8] (using disclosures from FARA to show how Saudi Arabia has
used lobbyists to attempt to influence members of Congress on key foreign policy issues).
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in Okinawa, Japan, opposing moving a U.S. military base there. If the
Okinawa government ever made a “request” to CBD for assistance in
helping inform U.S. policymakers about the issue, an aggressive
prosecutor might interpret this “request” as creating an agency
relationship under FARA between CBD and the Okinawa
government, even though CBD would likely have reached out to U.S.
policymakers on the issue anyway. In this scenario, requiring CBD to
register as a “foreign agent” of the Okinawa government would seem
to be both descriptively inaccurate and stigmatizing by implying that
CBD was not acting independently. Congress should also be careful
about the unintended consequences of using FARA to regulate
lobbying in a way that would create additional burdens that could be
unfair. In the 115th Congress, several members introduced bills that
would eliminate the LDA exemption in FARA and require those
engaging in lobbying activity for any foreign principal, such as a foreign
company or nonprofit, to register under FARA even if they are already
registered under the LDA.317 Eliminating the LDA exemption in
FARA could be appropriate in some situations, but it raises difficult
challenges about what is “foreign” in an interconnected world. For
instance, it is not clear why lobbyists for a Japanese carmaker should
be treated differently than an American one if both companies have
substantial U.S. and foreign operations. Disclosing their lobbying
materials under FARA could put foreign companies at a disadvantage
compared to their domestic counterparts.
2. Foreign Electioneering. FARA has been used to prosecute
foreign individuals for improperly influencing a U.S. election. Special
Prosecutor Robert Mueller brought two FARA-related charges in his
indictment against members of Russia’s Internet Research Agency
(“IRA”) for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.318 First,
the Special Prosecutor indicted IRA members for failing to report
expenditures to the FEC and for not registering under FARA when
producing, posting, and paying for online political advertisements.319
Second, the Special Prosecutor indicted IRA members for using false
personas and failing to register under FARA for organizing and
coordinating political rallies in the United States through social

317. See, e.g., Foreign Agents Registration Amendments Act of 2018, S. 2482, 115th Cong.
§ 5; Disclosing Foreign Influence Act, H.R. 4170, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
318. IRA Indictment, supra note 13, at 16–23.
319. Id. at 19–20.
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media.320 It is important to note that neither charge hinged on a
violation of FARA alone. Each also involved either violations of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) or using a false
persona.
Indeed, most types of electioneering by foreigners today is illegal
under U.S. law.321 In 1966, in a set of amendments to FARA, Congress
also changed U.S. election law to prohibit foreign agents from donating
to U.S. election campaigns on behalf of a foreign principal.322 This
provision, and its reference to FARA, was removed after FECA was
enacted, which bans campaign donations of money or other things of
value by foreigners to election campaigns or political parties.323 Federal
regulations also make it illegal for anyone—a U.S. citizen or
otherwise—to provide “substantial assistance” to a foreigner in either
contributing or dispersing money for a campaign purpose.324 As such,
FARA is generally a superfluous tool to combat foreign influence in
U.S. elections, as much of this activity is already illegal under U.S.
election law.
There are weaknesses in U.S. law that make it easier for foreign
individuals or governments to bypass election-law restrictions. For
example, there are concerns that foreigners can illegally route funds
for election purposes through domestic subsidiaries of foreign
companies325 or through “dark money” groups that do not have to
report the source of their funds.326 FARA does not do much to combat

320. Id. at 20–23.
321. Myles Martin, Foreign Nationals, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, (June 23, 2017),
https://www.fec.gov/updates/foreign-nationals [https://perma.cc/5UPE-DJV3]. However, a
foreigner may generally volunteer for a campaign as long as they are not compensated. Id.
322. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Amendments, Pub. L. 89-486, sec. 7, § 8, 80
Stat. 244, 248–49; Josh Gerstein, The Legal Battle that Could Undermine Law at Center of Mueller
Probe, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/08/the-legalbattle-that-could-undermine-law-at-center-of-mueller-probe-1052217 [https://perma.cc/N7826UYE].
323. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a) (2018); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 94-283, 90
Stat. 496.
324. 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(h) (2018).
325. IAN VANDEWALKER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, GETTING
FOREIGN
FUNDS
OUT
OF
AMERICA’S
ELECTIONS
18
(2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Getting%20Foreign%20Funds%2
0Out%20of%20America%27s%20Elections.%20Final_April9.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC3SB7TW].
326. Id. at 15; see also Lee Fang, Saudi-Led Oil Lobby Group Financed 2012 Dark Money
Attack Ads, NATION (Nov. 29, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/saudi-led-oil-lobbygroup-financed-2012-dark-money-attack-ads [https://perma.cc/CM77-7HMR].
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these roundabout avenues of influence, however, because these actors
are unlikely to register under the Act given that their actions are
already illegal.
Given that most electioneering by foreigners is already illegal
under U.S. law, FARA’s role in combatting foreign influence in
elections is minimal. The Act should focus on this more discreet role.
In particular, FARA’s requirement that those registered under it
report all their campaign contributions327 can be appropriate in some
situations. If a lobbyist has a contract from a foreign government, it
would be useful to have the lobbyist report campaign contributions to
help monitor whether she may be illicitly routing money from the
foreign principal to political campaigns.
This more limited role is particularly appropriate because it is not
clear whether FARA even covers many of the most prominent or
concerning examples of foreign interference in U.S. elections. For
instance, consider the special prosecutor’s charges against IRA
members for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. There is
an argument that FARA does not apply to these Russian nationals
because they engaged in these activities from Russia, and FARA
applies only to an “agent” who acts or engages “within the United
States” in covered activities.328 Although the Justice Department has
suggested that covered activity outside the country with a nexus to the
United States could require registration under FARA,329 it is not clear
a court would agree. This uncertainty severely limits the utility of
FARA for addressing digital attempts to influence a U.S. election
where all the relevant actors may be located outside the country.
3. Foreign Disinformation. Today, although there are sowers of
foreign disinformation that have the goal of disrupting U.S.
democracy,330 most foreign attempts to influence the opinion or ideas
of those in the United States are beneficial or benign. Indeed, the
United States has historically greatly benefited from the free exchange

327.
328.
329.
330.

For examples of such situations, see 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(8) (2018).
Id. § 611(c)(1).
Kelner et al., supra note 93.
For examples of alleged interference, see IRA Indictment, supra note 13, at 13–23.
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of ideas and opinions across borders, whether related to the abolition331
or suffrage332 movements, or the writing of the U.S. Constitution.333
As this Article has detailed, FARA applies to “agents” who
engage in covered activities, such as “political activities” or acting as
an “information-service employee,” for or in the interests of a foreign
principal. These provisions are sweeping—arguably too sweeping to
ever be enforced effectively. Instead, the Justice Department has
periodically focused on “nefarious” foreign propaganda, such as fascist
or communist propaganda. However, determining what is “nefarious”
is tremendously ambiguous and a ripe environment for politicized
enforcement.
Some additional background is helpful to understand why,
although FARA was initially adopted as a more civil-liberties-friendly
way to combat propaganda, this approach has ultimately proved
dangerous.334 Part of the challenge the Justice Department faced
during World War II in enforcing FARA was how to identify
“nefarious” propaganda and show that those promoting it were doing
so on behalf of a foreign source.335 Harold Lasswell, who would

331. See, e.g., Louis Billington, British Humanitarians and American Cotton, 1840-1860, 11 J.
AM. STUD. 313, 313 (1977) (describing how transatlantic Quaker networks were vital to the early
abolition movement in the United States).
332. See, e.g., Eliza Gray, How British Suffragettes Radicalized American Women, TIME (Oct.
23,
2015),
https://time.com/4084759/how-british-suffragettes-radicalized-american-women
[https://perma.cc/5ELU-ACRY] (describing the role of the British suffrage movement and the
International Women’s Suffrage Alliance in influencing the tactics of women in the U.S. suffrage
movement).
333. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late EighteenthCentury American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194–95 (1984) (tracking the
citation count of different European writers in American political writings between 1760 and
1805).
334. See GARY, supra note 94, at 195 (discussing how registration and disclosure requirements
were seen as “democracy-enhancing techniques” and “led speech-protective liberals to support
this form of propaganda control”).
335. By 1942, “publicity agent” and “information-service employee” were already broadly
defined in the Act. “Political activities” was not yet a covered activity, but “political propaganda”
was, which was defined as:
[A]ny oral, visual, graphic, written, pictoral, or other communication or expression . . .
which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes
will, or which he intends to prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other
way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with
reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a
foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of
the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions
as well as instigating violence in any other American Republic.
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 77-532, § 1(j), 56 Stat. 248, 250–51 (1942)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–612 (2018)).
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become one of the great political scientists of his generation,336
developed what he termed a scientific method to detect “foreign”
propaganda that was used in FARA prosecutions in at least four
cases.337 These included the parallel test that compared themes in
suspected propaganda with declared propaganda.338 Under the parallel
test, he identified fourteen common themes of Nazi propaganda.339 He
then compared these themes to the speech of alleged “agents” of Nazi
Germany to find parallels. These fourteen themes included some
obvious fascist tropes of the period like “Nazi Germany is just and
virtuous.”340 However, they also included many ideas that nonfascists
might also share. For instance, one theme was that the United States
and United Kingdom are “internally corrupt,” characterizing the
countries as having “political and economic injustice” or “spiritual
decay.”341 Another theme emphasized that the president of the United
States and the prime minister of the United Kingdom were
“reprehensible,” describing both leaders as “responsible for
suffering.”342
After World War II, a similar type of parallel test was used by the
Justice Department in its prosecution of W.E.B. Du Bois—claiming
that the Peace Information Center paralleled the messaging of
antinuclear propaganda abroad.343 Even today, the Justice Department
has argued that RT TV America parallels the messaging of the
Kremlin. In its letter to RT TV America, the Justice Department states

336. See Thomas W. Ennis, Harold D. Lasswell, Dead at 76; Was Top U.S. Political Scientist,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/20/archives/harold-d-lasswelldead-at-76-was-top-us-political-scientist.html [https://perma.cc/CSN8-QQAK] (“From 19:39 [sic]
to 1946, Dr. Lasswell was the director of War Communication Research at the Library of
Congress.”).
337. See Harold D. Lasswell, Detection: Propaganda Detection and the Courts, in LANGUAGE
OF POLITICS: STUDIES IN QUANTITATIVE SEMANTICS 177 (Harold D. Lasswell & Saul K. Padover
eds., 1949) (noting that Laswell’s methods were used during the Bookniga, Transocean, Auhegan,
and Pelly cases during World War II).
338. Id. at 177–78. The other four tests were the avowal test—explicit identification with one
party in a controversy; the concealed source test—not disclosing that one is relying on one source
in a controversy; the consistency test—consistency with declared propaganda; and the source
test—whether one source in a controversy is overrelied on. Id.
339. Id. at 180–86.
340. Id. at 182.
341. Id. at 180–81.
342. Id. at 181–82.
343. DU BOIS, supra note 215, at 99 (describing the government’s argument that an agency
relationship could be created under FARA when a domestic organization simply held a parallel
view as that of a foreign organization).
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that “RT’s broadcasts consistently mirror the opinions of the
Kremlin.”344 The Justice Department then used this claim to argue that
the Russian government itself should be considered a “foreign
principal” for which RT TV America is a “foreign agent.”345 Similarly,
the Chairman of the House Natural Resources made parallelism claims
in his 2018 investigation of U.S. environmental nonprofits for violating
FARA, arguing, for instance, that “[o]n important issues for Chinese
leadership, WRI’s position appears to closely reflect China’s goals and
objectives.”346
Although FARA can be easily politicized, the Act seems ill-suited
to fight foreign propaganda. Those perpetrating genuine
disinformation campaigns are unlikely to register under the Act, and
because they can undertake these campaigns through the internet,
those involved are often unlikely to even be in the country—making it
difficult to prosecute them successfully and creating ambiguity about
whether they even fall under FARA’s ambit.347
To address these concerns about the propagation of foreign
misinformation, FARA’s broad provisions should be either eliminated
as related to propaganda or much better targeted at specific groups,
such as media organizations clearly produced by foreign governments.
Otherwise, there is a high risk of media organizations, nonprofits, or
individuals with foreign connections being mislabeled as “foreign
agents” because they undertake speech that is deemed “nefarious.” In
a period of uncertain enforcement, FARA’s provisions can also lead to
unhealthy self-censorship as media organizations and nonprofits avoid
beneficial cross-border partnerships or stop engaging in controversial
speech to reduce the risk they are labeled a foreign agent.
A law like FARA that casts wide swaths of the media and
nonprofit sectors as “foreign agents” does not adequately combat the
spread of foreign propaganda in American society and is too likely to
be used to attack controversial speech or critics of the government. Just
because FARA is a poor tool to address foreign disinformation does

344. RT TV America Letter, supra note 248, at 6.
345. Id.
346. WRI Letter, supra note 237, at 4. Similarly, the Chairman of the House Natural
Resources Committee claimed that the “NRDC press releases, blog posts, and reports
consistently praise the Chinese government’s environmental initiatives and promote the image of
China as a global environmental leader.” NRDC Letter, supra note 237, at 3.
347. FARA only applies to agents who act “within the United States.” 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(c)(1)(i)–(iv). That said, the Justice Department has at times indicated that even a limited
nexus to the United States could trigger registration. Kelner et al., supra note 93.
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not mean the government should not take other actions, however.
Sensible interventions could include limitations on foreign ownership
of broadcast-television networks,348 efforts to improve the public’s
media literacy,349 appropriate regulation of social media, or broader
efforts to improve transparency in all online news.350
B. Reform Strategies
There are at least three potential reform strategies that Congress
could pursue to reduce the risk that FARA will be weaponized. These
would refocus the Act on regulating foreign influence in core
democratic activities, particularly lobbying, as well as either
eliminating the provisions related to propaganda or ensuring they
would only cover entities acting on behalf of foreign governments or
political parties. This would reduce the risk of stigmatizing entities or
individuals as “foreign agents” when such a label would be
inappropriate.
First, Congress could repeal FARA entirely. Most advanced
democracies do not have an equivalent to FARA.351 FARA was a
wartime statute that is a poor fit for a democracy that now has many
other tools available to it to regulate foreign influence. For example,
the LDA could be amended to ensure that lobbyists of foreign
governments and political parties or those operating on their behalf
have to report under more stringent requirements than other lobbyists,
thus fulfilling through other means one of the major current aims of
348. The Communications Act of 1934 allows only 25 percent foreign investment “in a U.S.
broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical fixed or en route radio licensee,” and FCC approval
is required for more than 25 percent foreign investment. Brian Weimer & Drew Svor, FCC
Liberalizes Rules for Foreign Investment in U.S. Broadcast Licensees, FCC L. BLOG (Oct. 10,
2016),
https://www.fcclawblog.com/2016/10/articles/fcc/fcc-liberalizes-rules-for-foreigninvestment-in-u-s-broadcast-licensees [https://perma.cc/7TM8-ZDKJ].
349. IREX, for example, developed a model called “Learn to Discern” to counter
disinformation in Ukraine. Learn To Discern (L2D) – Media Literacy Training, IREX,
https://www.irex.org/project/learn-discern-l2d-media-literacy-training [https://perma.cc/5A8GRHPA].
350. See, e.g., A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent
High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, at 5–6 (Mar. 2018)
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fakenews-and-online-disinformation [https://perma.cc/4A6G-XJPR] (follow “Report” hyperlink)
(advocating reforms such as promoting transparency of online news, empowering journalists to
tackle disinformation, and safeguarding the diversity and sustainability of the news media
ecosystem).
351. See AUSTRL. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & SEC., supra note 42,
at 39–40 (noting that FARA was the only comparable transparency scheme in operation to
FITSA).
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FARA.352 Similarly, Congress could take additional steps to ensure
that FECA’s ban on electioneering activities by foreigners is fully
enforced and to close pertinent loopholes in that statute, such as the
anonymity of giving through “dark money” groups.353 The federal
Communications Act’s restrictions on foreign ownership could be
modified to adapt to new needs and evolving media platforms.354
Additionally, Congress could reexamine the legislative underpinnings
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS”) to ensure that it acts aggressively and appropriately when
reviewing the national security implications of foreign investments in
the United States.355 Having more specific pieces of legislation to
address different types of foreign influence may ultimately be a more
effective response than using the blunt, one-size-fits-all labeling and
disclosure regime of FARA.
Second, Congress could clarify, and in some cases eliminate,
FARA’s vague or overbroad provisions. For example, the definition of
“foreign principals” could be narrowed to include only foreign
governments or political parties, or those acting on their behalf, since
these are the foreign actors whose influence seems to generate the most
concern.356 Similarly, Congress could better tailor the principal–agent
relationship in FARA to reflect the Restatement of Agency definition,
which requires a principal actually direct and control an agent and that
both parties agree to the relationship.357 Additionally, the laundry list
352. See Tom Spulak, Opinion, America’s Lobbying Laws Are Too Complex—Fixing FARA
Won’t Be Easy, HILL (Nov. 7, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/359131americas-lobbying-laws-are-too-complex-fixing-fara-wont-be-easy [https://perma.cc/9PXSRQK9] (arguing for changing the LDA to require lobbyists of foreign entities to disclose more
information).
353. See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act of 2017, S. 1585, 115th Cong. § 101 (proposing an amendment
to FECA to ban campaign contributions and expenditures by corporations that are controlled,
influenced, or owned by foreign nationals).
354. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 310, 48 Stat. 1064, 1086 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2018)) (listing the Communications Act’s foreign ownership
restrictions).
355. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2019) (describing the legislative authority
for CFIUS and general issues that have arisen surrounding it).
356. When FARA was amended in the early 1990s, the Senate version of the amendment
originally would have narrowed the definition of “foreign principals.” See S. REP. NO. 103-37, at
73 (1993) (describing how S. 349 would have redefined the term “foreign principal” to “exclude
entities other than foreign governments and political parties”).
357. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 951 (2018) (defining “agent of a foreign government” as “an individual who agrees to operate
within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official”).
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of covered activities in the current Act, including “soliciting” or
“disbursing” funds or acting as an “information-service employee,”358
could be removed or more narrowly defined, leaving only activities
directly related to either lobbying or electioneering. FARA could also
be amended to change both the name of the Act, and the label for
registering under it, to something less stigmatizing than “foreign
agent.”359
Third, Congress could create additional or broader exemptions.
For example, when Australia drew on FARA to draft FITS Act, the
Australian Parliament created a new limited exemption for charities,
as well as a broad exemption for humanitarian activity and for public
officials.360 FARA could similarly be amended to exempt nonprofits
that are not engaged in lobbying on behalf of a foreign government or
political party or in any electioneering activities. The Act could also be
amended to exempt media organizations that are not controlled by
foreign governments or to exempt public officials, as long as they are
not acting as “agents” as defined under the Restatement of Agency.
Reforms like these would not only make FARA less likely to be
abused but also would reduce confusion and uncertainty, thus
increasing the likelihood that the Act will be enforced in a systematic
way against types of foreign influence that do require attention.
Although Congress may adopt a path different than those articulated
here, whatever approach is adopted should recognize the high costs of
FARA’s current broad language, have clearly defined goals, and be
tailored to a legitimate problem.
CONCLUSION
FARA’s current language creates a significant danger of
politicized enforcement. In a globalized world, the Act’s broad
358. See supra Part II.B.
359. For example, in 1991, a bill was introduced in Congress to try “to remove the stigma of
being labeled a foreign agent by changing the name of the law to the Foreign Interests
Representation Act.” To Strengthen the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Hearing on H.R.
1725, H.R. 1381, H.R. 806 Before the H. Subcomm. on Admin. L. & Governmental Relations of
the H. Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 29 (1991) (Statement of Dan Glickman, Representative from
Kansas).
360. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Austl.) pts 2.24, 2.25A, 2.29C. A
limited nonprofit exemption under FARA has been previously introduced in Congress, but it
never passed. For example, Representative Glickman proposed adding an exemption for 501(c)
organizations registered under lobbying regulations and “whose activities are directly supervised,
directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole by citizens of the United States.” H.R. 1725,
102d Cong. § 1(a)(1)(B) (1991).
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definition of who is a “foreign agent” captures numerous nonprofits,
media organizations, and public officials. By covering so many actors
with its sweeping provisions, FARA provides the government with too
much discretion to target disfavored or dissident voices by imposing
burdensome registration requirements and labeling them “foreign
agents,” thereby marking them as less trustworthy, independent, and
legitimate.
When there is evidence of foreign interference in U.S. democratic
processes, it is easy to overreact and demand heavy regulation of
foreign voices. However, the country should not abandon its values or
self-inflict harm. In an interconnected world, U.S. law should
encourage, not discourage, civil society, public officials, and others to
create partnerships and ties across borders that help address the
world’s many challenges. Amidst concern about “foreign influence” in
the United States, it is important to better target FARA against foreign
influence that is a true threat to democracy. Such a focused
transparency approach both protects U.S. civil society and public
officials from politicized attack and sets a positive example in a world
where similar laws are being used to undermine democracy and civic
engagement.

